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INTRODUCTION
In 1984, by the margin of a single vote, the Supreme Court of the United
States ruled that the home-taping of a copyrighted television broadcast for
purposes of time-shifting constituted a fair use under the Copyright Act of
1976.1 Since that time, economic and legal commentators have generally
justified the decision in terms of market failure. If time-shifting were not a fair
use, the conventional understanding argues, then a license would be legally
required. Yet, the transaction costs incurred in negotiating and agreeing to
license terms with each home-taper would almost invariably exceed the
potential gains from trade. Because of these prohibitively high transaction
costs, a private market for time-shifting licenses would likely fail. Time-
shifting should therefore constitute a fair use. 2
. C. J. Morrow Research Professor of Law, Tulane University School of Law. I would
like to thank Leslie Lunney, Diane Zimmerman, Harry First, Rochelle Dreyfuss, and the
participants of the NYU Innovation Law Colloquium for their comments and suggestions.
I Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454-55 (1984) (finding that
"the record amply supports the... conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use").
2 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1601 (1982)
(asserting that "the courts and Congress have employed fair use to permit uncompensated
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Despite gaining widespread acceptance, the market failure account of Sony
does not accurately reflect either Justice Stevens's reasoning for the majority in
the case or a sound application of the relevant economic principles. Moreover,
the market failure account has sharply restricted Sony's potential reach.
Interpreted as an exceptional instance of market failure, Sony has become its
own limitation. If the inability to develop an effective licensing scheme
justified the Sony outcome, 3 then so long as a licensing scheme is or could be
made practicable, 4 the doctrine of fair use should presumably not apply. Under
the market failure account, Sony's finding of fair use thus becomes a rule
denying fair use absent market failure-a result the Court seemed to adopt
directly in distinguishing the fair use treatment of parody and satire in
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.5
transfers that are socially desirable but not capable of effectuation through the market"); see
also Richard P. Adelstein & Steven 1. Peretz, The Competition of Technologies in Markets
for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use in Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON.
209, 232-33 (1985) (recognizing the potential for market failure if courts required time-
shifting licenses, but arguing that markets would find a way to overcome the high
transaction costs).
I While I understand that circumstances other than high transaction costs can lead to
market failure, this Article focuses on the issue of private copying, where high transaction
costs would seem to be the principal barrier to negotiated licenses.
4 In Germany, the 1955 Grundig decision, BGHZ 17, 266, finding manufacturers of
home-taping equipment liable for the copying of their customers, led ten years later to the
first levy system in the German Copyright Act of 1965. See Juergen Weimann, Private
Home Taping Under Sec. 53(5) of the German Copyright Act of 1965, 30 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y 153, 154-56 (1982) (discussing the Grundig holding and its implications for
amendments to the 1965 Act). In the United States, Chief Judge Cowen suggested a similar
approach in his dissent in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States. As Cowen stated:
I agree with the court that we have no jurisdiction to order a copyright owner to
institute a licensing system if he does not wish to do so, but I think we are equally
powerless to assume the congressional role by granting what amounts to a blanket
exemption to defendant's libraries. Without too much difficulty, however, we can
determine the amount of just compensation that is due plaintiff for the infringement of
its copyrights. If that should be done, it may very well lead to a satisfactory agreement
between the parties for a continuation of the photocopying by defendant upon the
payment of a reasonable royalty to plaintiff.
487 F.2d 1345, 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (Cowen, C.J., dissenting), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). The Ninth Circuit may also have had such a levy system in
mind, though perhaps judicially imposed, when it held Sony liable for its customers'
unauthorized home-taping. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963,
976 (9th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that the district court consider "damages or a continuing
royalty," rather than an injunction, as the appropriate remedy for Sony's contributory
infringement), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
5 510 U.S. 569, 580-81 (1995) ("Parody needs to mimic an original to make its point, and
so has some claim to use the creation of its victim's (or collective victims') imagination,
whereas satire can stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the very act of
borrowing.").
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With the development and dissemination of digital technology, the
importance of private copying and its legal status, whether fair or unfair under
copyright law, has only increased. Yet, despite its status as the Court's first
and only pronouncement on the issue, Sony has played surprisingly little role in
this ongoing debate. Even in cases bearing seemingly close similarity to the
home-taping at issue in Sony itself, such as the private, home copying of
musical works, courts have refused to follow Sony's fair use outcome. 6
Having been narrowly construed as an exceptional instance of market failure,
Sony seldom appears to have direct application to fair use cases generally, and
courts have repeatedly rejected application of the Sony analysis outside of its
specific factual context. Ironically, until "clarified" by the Court in Campbell,7
courts relied on certain dicta in Sony limiting the availability of the fair use
doctrine for commercial uses far more than they relied on Sony's actual fair use
holding.
In this Article, I would like to revisit Sony with the aim of achieving, if not a
radical rewriting, at least a rational revitalization of Sony and copyright's fair
use doctrine more generally. Properly understood, Sony stands not for the
proposition that fair use is justified only in those exceptional cases where a
licensing scheme or some other market mechanism is impractical. Rather,
Sony stands for the recognition of fair use as a central and vital arbiter between
two competing public interests. On the one side, a use that is considered fair
and is allowed to continue may indirectly lead to fewer works of authorship by
reducing the incentives to create such works. On the other, allowing such use
to continue may directly improve the public's ability to use, transform, or
otherwise obtain access to existing works.
In defining the balance between these competing public interests, Sony
begins with a presumption in favor of fair use and a broad conception of the
public interest that fair use protects. Merely increasing access to a work, even
unauthorized access, represents a sufficient public interest to invoke the fair
use doctrine. A transformative or "productive" use is not required. Once the
fair use doctrine is invoked, Sony places the burden squarely on the copyright
owner to justify recognition of her private ownership rights. Only where the
copyright owner has demonstrated by the preponderance of the evidence that
the net benefit 8 to society will be greater if a use is prohibited, should a court
6 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001)
(distinguishing Sony's fair use outcome in a case involving private sharing of musical files);
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(distinguishing Sony's fair use outcome in a case involving a service that allowed a
subscriber who already owned a copy of a musical work to download that work from the
Internet to make the work accessible at different locations).
' See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583-84 (rejecting the notion, "ostensibly culled from Sony,
that 'every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively ... unfair.
(citation omitted)).
8 I refer to net social benefit in order to recognize expressly that copyright's incentive
effect does not create more works out of thin air, as it were, but in fact draws resources
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conclude that a use is unfair.
Moreover, in evaluating copyright owners' attempts to justify their private
ownership rights, Sony, quite properly, requires courts to exercise a healthy
skepticism. We do not know nearly as much as we sometimes pretend
regarding the economic working of the markets for copyrighted works, nor do
we fully understand the relationship between increased copyright revenues and
the ultimate public purpose of copyright--creation of additional works. Given
the inherently speculative nature of the relationship between more expansive
rights and additional creative works, Sony counsels caution before enjoining
unauthorized copying that offers some clear public benefit, even if that public
benefit is "only" increased convenience and access.
When we reexamine Sony as it was written, we find that the market failure
away from other productive activities. In evaluating the social benefit associated with
producing additional works, we must therefore consider what is lost because creative
resources are used in producing additional copyrighted works, rather than in some other
productive activity. This trade-off has not played as important a role as it should in
copyright law, and only a few commentators have acknowledged the issue. See BENJAMIN
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 75 (1967) ("Magnify the headstart and you
may conceivably run the risk of attracting too much of the nation's energy into the
copyright-protected sectors of the economy."); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman,
The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 425, 430 (1966) (papers and
proceedings) (considering whether goods induced by copyright protection are more valuable
than those that would have been produced absent such protection); Arnold Plant, The
Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167, 170 (1934) (discussing "the
alternative products which free competition would allow to emerge" in the absence of
copyright protection). Fritz Machlup expressed a similar concern in the patent area.
Machlup argued:
It is easy to conceive of the possibility that such allocation [of productive resources to
research and development] is too meager. But can there ever be too much? Is not
more research and development always better than less? Is it possible that too much is
devoted to the inventive effort of the Nation? This depends on what it is that is
curtailed when inventive activity is expanded. More of one thing must mean less of
another, and the question is, what it is of which there will be less. . . . Whenever
permanent economic policies-not just war or depression measures-are discussed, sound
economics must start from the principle that no activity can be promoted without
encroaching on some other activity. More of one service or product must mean less of
another.
SENATE SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS, SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 45-46 (Comm. Print
1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup); see also William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on
Exploitation of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 YALE L.J. 267, 268-69
(1966) (discussing the appropriate level of diversion of productive output into innovative
activities). I have tried to suggest some approaches to the issue in my other work. See
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 421 (2001)
(examining the "relationship between patents and allocative efficiency" in an e-commerce
context); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49
VAND. L. REV. 483, 579-654 (1996) (analyzing the argument that copyright promotes
allocative efficiency due to the ease of copying).
[Vol. 82:975
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account is, at best, a one-dimensional caricature of Justice Stevens's sensitive
and careful attempt to understand the economic consequences of time-shifting
in light of the evidence presented. As Justice Stevens's examination of these
economic consequences reflects, unauthorized copying of a public good is not
the economic, legal, or moral equivalent of theft.9 When a private good is
stolen, the theft necessarily deprives the original owner of possession. Making
an unauthorized copy does not. Because a public good such as a broadcast
television program is characterized by nonrivalrous consumption, any number
of individuals can copy an existing broadcast without thereby depriving some
other individual of access. Because of this lack of rivalry, only when copying,
given its nature and extent, becomes so widespread that it threatens the
incentives necessary for a program's production does government intervention,
in the form of copyright, become potentially desirable. We should not
therefore presume, as the market failure approach necessarily does, that a
private market regime is necessarily desirable. Rather, as Justice Stevens's
opinion suggests, we must balance the competing public interests at stake.
I. SONY, MARKET FAILURE, AND THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC GOODS
On October 19, 1981, the Ninth Circuit issued its panel opinion in Universal
City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.'0 The court held that the use of a Sony-
manufactured Betamax machine to record copyrighted television programs was
not a fair use and that Sony was liable for its customers' unauthorized
copying." In concluding that home-taping was not a fair use, the Ninth Circuit
drew a line between "productive use" of a copyrighted work, where a
defendant has taken copyrighted material and used it to fashion some new
copyrighted work, and unproductive use, where "copyrighted material is
reproduced for its intrinsic use.112 Only productive uses, the Ninth Circuit
wrote, had historically and could now legitimately claim fair use status.' 3 The
Ninth Circuit also questioned in passing whether large-scale home-taping
could appropriately be considered non-commercial. 14 Finally, in evaluating the
fourth and "most important" fair use factor-the effect of the use upon the
value of the copyrighted work-Disney and Universal admitted that home-
' Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 450 n.33 (identifying important distinctions between time-
shifting and theft).
10 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
1 Id. at 969-76 (finding the fair use doctrine inapplicable and concluding that Sony was
liable for its customers' infringements).
12 Id. at 971-72 ("Without a 'productive use' . . . the mass copying of the sort involved in
this case precludes an application of fair use.").
'3 Id. at 970-72, 974 & n.13 (discussing fair use's traditionally exclusive application to
productive uses of copyrighted work).
1" Id. at 972 n.9 ("The 'non-commercial' characterization of home video-recording is a
bit misleading. The corporate defendants involved in the lawsuit are obviously not in the
business of promoting home video-recording for strictly altruistic reasons.").
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taping had not caused any present financial harm, but offered a variety of
theories to explain how home-taping might reduce the value of their respective
portfolios of copyrighted works in the future. After considering the evidence,
the district court rejected these theories, finding that the theories of possible
future harm relied on assumptions that were "based on neither fact nor
experience" and were "to some extent inconsistent and illogical."'1 5 On appeal,
the Ninth Circuit held that the district court's standard "was much too strict."'16
In the Ninth Circuit's view, the use at issue necessarily interfered with the
market for the original because it involved wholesale copying of the works.' 7
Although the Ninth Circuit expressly acknowledged that "[t]he harm to a
copyright plaintiff [from private copying] is inherently speculative,"'" the court
stated that the money spent on videotape recorders and associated equipment
demonstrated that home-tapers "assign economic value to their ability to have
control over access to copyrighted works."' 19 From the fact of value, the Ninth
Circuit inferred that a corresponding legal right to "exploit" that value must
exist.20
By any measure, the Ninth Circuit's decision represented a radical
expansion in the legal rights of copyright owners. As Sony counsel Dean
Dunlavey would subsequently argue in his petition for certiorari, the Ninth
Circuit's decision was "the first judicial decision in American legal history to
find as copyright infringement either (a) conduct taking place entirely in the
privacy of the home or (b) making a copy of anything solely for private
personal use." 2' It was also the first "to hold a manufacturer ... strictly 'liable
for [its customers'] use as a contributory infringer."' 22 If that were not enough
to attract the Supreme Court's attention, the Ninth Circuit heavily criticized the
Court of Claims' decision in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States that
photocopying medical and scientific journals for medical research constituted
11 The district court rejected the copyright owners' arguments on the fourth fair use
factor on the grounds that their predictions of future harm relied on assumptions that were
"based on neither fact nor experience" and, as even plaintiffs admitted, "to some extent
inconsistent and illogical." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429,
451 (C.D. Cal. 1979), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
16 Universal City Studios, Inc., 659 F.2d at 973 & n.l I (asserting that the district court
confused the applicable legal standard for "harm" for purposes of fair use with that for
injunctive relief).
17 Id. at 974 n. 13 ("Put another way, because the copies serve the same function as the
original, the 'functional test' suggests that fair use is not available.").
I Ild. at 971.
19 Id. at 974.
20 Id. ("It is clear that home users assign economic value to their ability to have control
over access to copyrighted works. The copyright laws would seem to require that the
copyright owner be given the opportunity to exploit this market.").
21 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at n.1, Sony Corp. (No. 81-1687).
22 Id. at n.2.
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fair use. 23 Quoting Judge Nichols's dissent in Williams & Wilkins Co., the
Ninth Circuit ridiculed the Court of Claims' decision as the "'Dred Scott... of
copyright law.' ' 24 Given that the Supreme Court had voted to affirm Williams
& Wilkins Co., albeit by an equally divided vote,25 it is perhaps unsurprising
that on June 14, 1982, the Court granted certiorari and agreed to review the
Ninth Circuit's decision.26
A. Sony as Written: Fair Use as Balancing
In overturning the Ninth Circuit's decision and concluding that home-taping
was a fair use, the Court defined fair use as an "equitable rule of reason
balance. '27 Through the fair use doctrine, the Court explained, Congress
expressly directed courts to balance, not the private interest of copyright
owners in broader protection against the public interest in narrower
protection, 28 but the competing public interests at stake. 29 On one side of this
23 487 F.2d 1345, 1347 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (finding that widespread photocopying of medical
and scientific articles at institutions involved in scientific research was fair use), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
24 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting
Williams & Wilkins Co., 487 F.2d at 1387 (Nichols, J., dissenting)). In the Dred Scott
decision, the Court had held that a slave remained property even in a free state. Dred Scott
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 453 (1856). As between allowing individuals to tape
television programs in the privacy of their own homes without the copyright owner's
express authorization, and extending the copyright owner's property rights into American
consumers' bedrooms, the latter approach, adopted by the Ninth Circuit, would seem to
parallel more closely the logic and rationale of Dred Scott.
25 Justice Blackmun, who would later author the dissent in Sony Corp., recused himself
in Williams & Wilkins Co., leaving the Court with eight evenly divided justices. See
Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 420 U.S. 376, 376 (1975).
26 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 457 U.S. 1116 (1982).
27 Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 454 (1984) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
28 In her article, Professor Gordon rejects as a fair use standard a balancing of the "social
value" of the use against "any detriment to the artist." See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1615.
Such an approach "would be to propose depriving copyright owners of their right in the
property precisely when they encounter those users who could afford to pay for it." Id. I
agree that balancing social value against detriment to the artist is improper, but not because
of any inherent right of the artist. Rather, such a balance is improper because it mistakenly
weighs the public interest in access against a private interest in revenue. A proper balance
sets the public interest in access against the public interest in additional works.
29 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 431-32. The Court held that:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like the limited
copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a balance of competing claims
upon the public interest: Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private
motivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad availability of literature,
music, and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
return for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
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balance, unauthorized time-shifting "yields societal benefits" by "expand[ing]
public access to freely broadcast television programs. '30  On the other,
unauthorized time-shifting might reduce the supply and variety of original
works available by impairing the incentives for their creation. Yet, after
carefully reviewing the factual evidence of record, the Court agreed with the
district court that the copyright owners had "failed to demonstrate that time-
shifting would cause any likelihood of non-minimal harm to the potential
market for, or the value of, their copyrighted works."'3' Given this finding, the
Court held that a prohibition on time-shifting "would merely inhibit access to
ideas without any countervailing benefit. '32 Because the balance of competing
public interests at stake weighed in favor of allowing unauthorized time-
shifting to continue, the Court affirmed the district court's finding that home-
taping constituted a fair use.33
In establishing and applying this balancing approach to the fair use issue, the
Court also expressly addressed and resolved a number of arguments that
remain relevant to the ongoing debate over the legal status of private copying
today. First, the Court directly rejected the Ninth Circuit's attempt to limit the
application of fair use to "productive" uses.34 Although "[t]he distinction
between 'productive' and 'unproductive' uses may be helpful in calibrating the
balance.... it cannot be wholly determinative." 35  As the Court noted,
Congress "expressly identified ... [m]aking a copy of a copyrighted work for
the convenience of a blind person ... as an example of fair use."' 36 Because it
is in the public interest, increased access is alone sufficient to invoke the fair
use doctrine; some "productive" use is not required. 37
Second, the Court expressly rejected the attempts of respondents Universal
and Disney to characterize private copying as "commercial." On this issue,
Universal and Disney initially argued that private copying should be
considered "commercial" because it can substitute for a commercial
transaction: the purchase of authorized copies.38 Alternatively, Universal and
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
Id. (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (Stewart,
J.))
30 Id
3' Id. at 456.
32 Id. at 450-51.
33 Id. at 454-56.
31 Id. at 455 n.40 (stating that the Ninth Circuit's "understanding of 'fair use' [as
requiring a productive use] was erroneous").
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. (observing that "[v]irtually any time-shifting that increases viewer access to
television programming may result in a ... benefit" that might justify application of fair
use).
38 See Home Recording of Copyrighted Works: Hearing on H.R. 4783, H.R. 4794, H.R.
4808, H.R. 5250, H.R. 5488, and H.R. 5705 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties
[Vol. 82:975
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Disney argued that the private character of the copying should not convert
what would otherwise constitute infringement into a fair use, invoking an
analogy that Professor Laurence Tribe had offered on behalf of copyright
owners at the legislative hearings following the Ninth Circuit's decision:
"Jewel theft surely is not converted into a non-commercial veniality if stolen
jewels are simply worn rather than sold."'39 The Court rejected both arguments
and expressly recognized the fallacy of applying Professor Tribe's private
good analogy to the public goods at issue in copyright:
The use to which stolen jewelry is put is quite irrelevant in determining
whether depriving its true owner of his present possessory interest in it is
venial; because of the nature of the item and the true owner's interests in
physical possession of it, the law finds the taking objectionable even if
the thief does not use the item at all .... Time-shifting does not even
remotely entail comparable consequences for the copyright owner.40
Because of television's public good character, any number of consumers can
time-shift without depriving any other consumer of their ability to view a
program. Unauthorized time-shifting of a copyrighted television program,
unlike theft of a private good, does not deprive the copyright owner of a
present possessory interest in a tangible good. 41  Because of that critical
difference, unauthorized copying, again unlike theft, becomes socially
undesirable only when it goes so far as to threaten the public's interest in an
adequate supply of creative works.
Third, in evaluating whether any given use poses a threat to the public's
interest in additional works, both the Copyright Act and the Court approach the
and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 1250 (1982)
(memorandum of Professor Laurence H. Tribe) (arguing that home-taping should be
commercial "even if the consumer does not sell the homemade tape because the consumer
will not buy tapes separately sold by the copyrightholder"), quoted in Sony Corp., 464 U.S.
at 450 n.33.
39 Id.
40 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 450 n.33; see also United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 243
(5th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that taping a copyrighted broadcast "does not implicate a
tangible item ... [;] nothing was removed from someone's possession").
41 Of course, if someone shoplifted a CD of the latest music group, that would constitute
theft of a tangible, private good and would be punishable under applicable state laws. Such
conduct would not constitute copyright infringement, however. Moreover, under applicable
state laws, the theft of a CD would presumably be valued at the market price for the CD, not
at the value of the intangible rights to reproduction that copyright protects. For a discussion
of this issue, see BRUCE STERLING, THE HACKER CRACKDOWN: LAW AND DISORDER ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 250-81 (1992). Sterling discusses the trial of Craig Neidorf, a hacker
accused of stealing and publishing roadmap documents to Bell-South's Enhanced 911
System. In its prosecution of Niedorf, the government originally valued the documents at
$79,449, reflecting the costs of overhead and research and development. Id. at 257-59. The
defense argued that similar information could be purchased for $13. Id. at 276-77. The
government eventually dropped the case against Neidorf. Id. at 281.
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issue indirectly, focusing on the effect the unauthorized copying has on "the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. '42 Yet, in its opinion,
the Court made clear that the private interest of the copyright owner in
maximizing her own revenue is relevant under the fair use doctrine only as a
proxy for the public's interest in additional works. As the Court explained at
the outset of its opinion:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither
unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit.
Rather, the limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose
may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward. .... 43
To help ensure that copyright continues to serve this public purpose, the
Court placed the burden of proof on the fair use issue squarely on the copyright
owners. As the Court explained, Congress expressly "prefaced.. . the
definition of exclusive rights in § 106 of the present Act... by the words
'subject to sections 107 through 118,"' thus limiting the exclusive rights of the
copyright owner. 44 Through this phrasing, Congress specified that certain uses
are outside the scope of the copyright owner's exclusive rights, thereby
ensuring that such uses could continue even without the copyright owner's
consent. 45  Rather than an exception to a presumptively private property
regime, allowances for fair use are therefore inherent limitations on the rights
afforded copyright owners. Moreover, the Sony Court reasoned that because a
copyright owner bears the burden of proving that infringement has occurred,
and because fair uses are non-infringing, the statute's language imposed on the
copyright owner the burden of proving not only that unauthorized copying has
occurred, but also that it constituted an unfair use. 46 As a result, when, for
42 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000); see Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 450 ("This is not, however, the
end of the inquiry because Congress has also directed us to consider 'the effect of the use
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."' (citation omitted)).
43 Sony Corp., 646 U.S. at 429; see also id. at 431-32 ("[T]he ultimate aim [of the
copyright holder's statutory monopoly] is... to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good.") (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)).
44 Id. at 447 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982)). Congress amended the introductory
provisions of § 106 three times between 1990 and 1999. Section 106 is currently subject to
additional limitations in §§ 119-121. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
41 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002) ("Notwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and
106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work.., is not an infringement of copyright.").
46 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 433-34 ("[A]nyone... who makes a fair use of the work is
not an infringer of the copyright with respect to such use .... To prevail, they [Universal
and Disney] have the burden of proving that users of the Betamax have infringed their
copyrights ...."). Courts applied a similar approach in the nineteenth century when fair use
first developed. For example, in 1896, a federal circuit court in California, in an action
alleging repeated piracy of the complainant's books on physiognomy, held:
While the respondent candidly admits that she consulted complainant's works in
[Vol. 82:975
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example, the effect of the use on the potential market for or value of a
copyrighted work is unclear, as even the Ninth Circuit admitted was the case
for home-taping, the copyright owner has failed to establish infringement.47
B. Sony Rewritten: Fair Use as Market Failure
Although both coherent and sensible, Justice Stevens's explanation of the
Sony fair use outcome has been largely displaced in copyright law by an
altemative explanation based upon the economic concept of market failure.
Commonly traced to a Columbia Law Review article by Professor Wendy J.
Gordon published in December 1982,48 the market failure account seeks to
justify Sony's fair use outcome by arguing that the transaction costs involved
in negotiating individual time-shifting licenses would inevitably exceed the
potential gains in trade available. As a result, the market for time-shifting
licenses would fail, justifying a finding of fair use.49
Professor Gordon began her article with a version of the first fundamental
theorem of welfare economics. 50  This theorem formally states that if
consumers are rational5' and markets are complete and perfectly competitive,
preparing and writing her own, and while the excerpts or parallelisms tend to show that
she borrowed from complainant's books, and in several instances certainly approached
very closely to the line that marks the boundary between a fair and an illegitimate use,
still I think, upon the whole of the case, the complainant, on whom the burden of proof
lies, has failed to show such substantial piracy [as to constitute infringement].
Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 13-14 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (emphasis added).
17 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451 ("In this case, [the copyright plaintiffs] failed to carry
their burden with respect to home time-shifting."); see id at 454 (noting the Federal District
Court's conclusion that the "[h]arm from time-shifting is speculative and, at best, minimal"
(citation omitted)); see also supra note 46 (identifying a dual burden on the plaintiff of
proving infringement and unfair use). But see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510
U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (noting that "[s]ince fair use is an affirmative defense," the burden of
proof is on the defendant asserting that use is fair); infra notes 68-70 and accompanying text
(discussing the conflict between Campbell and Sony in allocating the burden of proof).
48 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1601, 1605 (using market failure analysis to determine when
courts will allow "uncompensated transfers that are socially desirable"); see also Wendy J.
Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Commodification and Market
Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND
CULTURAL RAMIFICATIONS (Neil Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren eds.) (forthcoming 2002)
[hereinafter Gordon II] (refining market failure analysis by distinguishing between
excusable cases of use under a "market malfunction" and justifiable cases of use in light of a
"market limitation").
4' Gordon, supra note 2, at 1655 (identifying prohibitively high transaction costs and
inability to identify individual copyright violators as two areas of market failure present in
Sony). Additionally, Professor Gordon suggests some measures aimed at curing market
failure such as the collection of royalties by agents of the copyright holder. See id. at 1656.
S0 See id. at 1605-1610.
5' For a review of the experimental studies on consumer rationality and the questions
they raise regarding the importance of the rationality assumption in economic analysis, see
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then the allocation of resources achieved in a competitive equilibrium through
private markets is Pareto optimal. 52 Within economics, this theorem can be
and is proven mathematically.5 3 More importantly, in the real world, the
general success of economies based upon private markets, and the general
failure of centrally-planned economies, tends to confirm the relative efficiency
of private markets. Nevertheless, both the economics literature and real world
experience recognize that there are circumstances under which markets will
fail to achieve an efficient outcome.5 4
In her article, Professor Gordon takes this concept of market failure and uses
it to formulate a three-part test for applying copyright's fair use doctrine.
Under Professor Gordon's test, a use that would otherwise constitute
infringement is fair if: "(1) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to
defendant is socially desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause
substantial injury to the incentives of the plaintiff copyright owner. '55
Professor Gordon identifies prohibitively high transaction costs, informational
asymmetry, and negative externalities as three potential causes of market
failure. 56 High transaction costs may lead to market failure, Professor Gordon
explains, because they may prevent otherwise desirable transfers.5 7  In
applying her test to the time-shifting at issue in Sony, Professor Gordon
suggests that, given the small potential gains in trade available from time-
shifting licenses, "[h]ome users might well find transaction costs prohibitively
high if they were required to bargain individually with copyright owners over
Alvin E. Roth, Introduction to Experimental Economics, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 67-79 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995).
52 See ANDREU MAs-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & JERRY R. GREEN,
MICROECONOMIC THEORY 307-08 (1995). A given allocation of resources is "Pareto
optimal" if there is no way to reallocate the resources available that would make at least one
person better off without making anyone else worse off. Id.
53 Id. at 326-27 (including formulae for the First and Second Fundamental Theorems of
Welfare Economics), 549-50 (adding to the general equilibrium proof a "very weak
assumption" that preferences are locally nonsatiated).
54 Id. at 350-510 (exploring externalities, market power, informational asymmetries, and
moral hazards as instances of potential market failure).
11 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1614. In her introduction, Professor Gordon offered a
slightly different version of her three-part test: "Where (1) defendant could not appropriately
purchase the desired use through the market; (2) transferring control over the use to
defendant would serve the public interest; and (3) the copyright owner's incentives would
not be substantially impaired by allowing the user to proceed," courts should find a fair use.
Id. at 1601 (citations omitted).
56 See id. at 1607-1608 (discussing the elements of "perfect competition" necessary to
achieve an efficient market).
57 Id. at 1608 ("When the transaction costs outweigh the net benefits that the parties
would otherwise anticipate from a transfer, then the presence of the transaction costs may
block an otherwise desirable shift in resource use." (citation omitted)).
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the right to tape each desired program."58 Because of this potential failure of
the market for time-shifting licenses, Professor Gordon concludes that a fair
use finding might be justified in the Sony case.59
Although Professor Gordon's analysis can reasonably be interpreted to
support the Sony Court's subsequent finding of fair use, 60 the actual effect of
Professor Gordon's analysis, and the market failure account more generally,
has been to limit Sony's potential reach. In the realm of private goods, where
the concept of market failure first developed, private property and the resulting
markets are presumptively efficient. In that context, "market failure" is a
catch-all phrase for the circumstances where private markets will fail to
achieve a Pareto optimal outcome, potentially justifying government
intervention. 61 However, because private markets are presumptively efficient,
government intervention is justified only in cases of market failure. When we
equate copyright's fair use doctrine with the economic concept of market
failure, we necessarily impose on copyright law a corresponding economic
framework. Thus, markets for copies of copyrighted works become the
presumptively efficient markets associated with private property more
generally. Fair use becomes a form of government intervention that, like
government intervention into other markets, requires affirmative justification.
And market failure becomes for copyright, just as it is for private property
more generally, the exclusive justification for such government intervention.
Although it is not clear that Professor Gordon intended to embrace this
economic framework in its entirety, she formally invokes the presumptive
efficiency of markets for private goods in her analysis and recognizes that
government intervention is appropriate only where the market would otherwise
fail. 62 Professor Gordon then argues that this presumptive efficiency should
extend to markets for copyrighted works. 63 As in the private goods context,
58 Id. at 1655-56 (noting that identifying and contacting each copyright owner prior to
each broadcast may be an "insurmountable" obstacle to market transfer of time-shifting
licenses). Professor Gordon adds that it "might be impossible" for the copyright owners to
detect violators. Id. at 1655. "Bargains that cannot be enforced," Professor Gordon
continues, "present a classic type of market failure." Id.
19 Id. at 1656 (suggesting, however, that the lower courts should have inquired into the
availability of a "market cure," such as the collection of royalty fees by a centralized agent).
60 See id. Professor Gordon suggests, however, that time-shifting should be prohibited if
a prohibition would lead to the creation of some administrative or legal mechanism that
would approximate the market for time-shifting licenses. See id. (comparing the district
court's and the Ninth Circuit's discussions of the manufacturer's contributory liability and
the potential for a judicially operated "market cure").
61 See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 11 (2d ed. 2001)
("Economists use the term market failure to refer to a situation in which the market on its
own fails to allocate resources efficiently.").
62 Id. at 1608-10 (discussing the corrective purposes of truth-in-lending and disclosure
laws, as well as negligence and intentional tort law).
" Id. at 1612 (explaining how "[c]opyright law.., allows a market for intellectual
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fair use therefore becomes an affirmative defense with the burden squarely on
the defendant to prove that an exception to the private property baseline is
justified.64 Professor Gordon thus seems to apply directly the private good
conception of market failure to the market for copyrighted works.
By invoking the presumptive efficiency of private markets, a market failure
approach to fair use necessarily replaces the Sony Court's balancing test with a
threshold standard. Under the market failure approach, only if a likelihood of
market failure is shown as a threshold matter should a court proceed to balance
the competing public interests at stake.65 Furthermore, even if a defendant can
show a strong likelihood of market failure and surmount this initial threshold,
the presumptive efficiency of private markets implicit in the market failure
framework remains. Given that private markets are presumptively efficient,
additional revenues to copyright owners will necessarily lead to increased
production of copyrighted works. As a result, when evaluating the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of a copyrighted work, a loss in
revenue (or potential revenue) to the copyright owner becomes important for
its own sake, rather than as a proxy for the public interest in additional works.
Under the market failure standard, any significant likelihood that the use will
(or, in some as yet undeveloped market, may) reduce revenues to the copyright
owner will bar a finding of fair use. 66
As the market failure interpretation of Sony has gained adherents, the
property to function").
I Id. at 1625 (proposing that the defendant should bear the "initial burden of proving
that market failure exists" as well as the subsequent burden of demonstrating that "his use
serves some social purpose"). Moreover, Professor Gordon's analysis repeatedly refers to
fair use as an "award" to the defendant. Id. at 1614 (indicating that "[flair use should be
awarded to the defendant in a copyright infringement action" if the above-described three
part test is met).
65 See id. at 1615 ("Thus, one of the necessary preconditions for premising fair use on
economic grounds is that market failure must be present."). In a recent essay revisiting her
original position, Professor Gordon argues for an expanded conception of market failure, but
retains her proposed requirement of a showing of market failure as a threshold fair use
requirement. See Gordon II, supra note 48, at 2 (introducing the notions of "market
malfunction" and "market limitations" as two classes of market failures).
66 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 599 (1994) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The Campbell Court noted:
Fair use is an affirmative defense, so doubts about whether a given use is fair should
not be resolved in favor of the self-proclaimed parodist. We should not make it easy
for musicians to exploit existing works and then later claim that their rendition was a
valuable commentary on the original .... If we allow any weak transformation to
qualify as parody, however, we weaken the protection of copyright. And
underprotection of copyright disserves the goals of copyright just as much as
overprotection, by reducing the financial incentive to create.
Id. In her more recent work on the issue, Professor Gordon argues that in some cases, a use
should be fair despite potentially substantial interference with the market value of the
copyrighted work. See Gordon II, supra 48, at 25-33.
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Court's own explanation of its decision has become marginalized. 67 For
example, in Campbell, the Court declared that "[s]ince fair use is an
affirmative defense," the burden of proving fair use rests on the defendant
seeking its protection. 68 In allocating the burden in this manner, Justice Souter
failed even to mention Sony's contrary resolution of the issue.69 While the
Court is, of course, free to reverse itself on this issue (or to limit Sony's
allocation of the burden of proof to cases involving non-commercial uses), one
would hope that the Court, at the very least, would recognize and acknowledge
that it is reversing itself.70 Courts of Appeals have treated Sony with a similar
67 Ironically, the most prominent case to embrace Sony's essential reasoning, Recording
Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072, (9th Cir. 1999), was
not a fair use case at all. Rather, the Ninth Circuit suggested that there was an analogy
between Sony's analysis of time-shifting and the space-shifting that a portable MP3 player,
the Rio, made possible. See id. at 1079 ("The Rio merely makes copies in order to render
portable, or "space-shift," those files that already reside on a user's hard drive."). Because
of the parallel private, non-commercial nature of time-shifting and space-shifting, the Ninth
Circuit cited Sony as support for its conclusion that the Rio did not qualify as a digital audio
recording device within the meaning of the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C.
§ 1002(a)(1), (2) (2000). Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am., 180 F.3d at 1079-1081
(concluding that since the Rio "cannot directly reproduce a digital music recording" or
"reproduce a digital music recording 'from a transmission'," the product was not subject to
the regulations and prohibitions in the Audio Home Recording Act).
68 Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (holding that the burden of proof with respect to the fourth
fair use factor rests on the defendants seeking to assert the fair use "defense").
69 See id. at 590 & n.20 (citing Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S.
539, 561 (1985), and H.R. REP. No. 102-836 at 3 (1992), for the proposition that fair use is
an affirmative defense). Despite the Harper & Row Court's reference to fair use as an
affirmative defense, in discussing the fourth factor, the Harper & Row Court stated that
"once a copyright holder establishes with reasonable probability the existence of a causal
connection between the infringement and a loss of revenue, the burden properly shifts to the
infringer to show that this damage would have occurred had there been no taking of
copyrighted expression." 471 U.S. at 567 (finding that defendant's verbatim copying of
approximately 300 words from an unpublished manuscript written by President Gerald Ford
was not a fair use). Although not perfectly clear, because the Court curiously adds language
dealing with an award of damages, switching the burden on the fourth factor to the
defendant would seem to suggest that the burden of proof was initially on the plaintiff. The
Harper & Row Court also stated: "[T]o negate fair use, one need only show that if the
challenged use 'should become widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market
for the copyrighted work."' Id. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 451) (emphasis only
on "potential" in original). This language again suggests that the burden of proof is on the
plaintiff "[t]o negate fair use."
70 At oral argument, Bruce S. Rogow, counsel for Campbell and petitioner 2 Live Crew,
simply conceded that his clients had the burden of proof on the fair use issue. See Campbell
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 1993 U.S. TRANS LEXIS 113, at *17 (Nov. 9, 1993) ("[Wlhen
the plaintiff files a lawsuit, all the plaintiff need show is ownership of the copyright and
copying, and then the burden shifts to the defendant to raise the fair use affirmative
defense."). Whatever the reason for Mr. Rogow's concession, there seems little reason why
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lack of respect. For example, although Sony found home-taping for personal
consumption to be non-commercial despite its widespread nature and potential
for displacing sales of authorized tapes, 71 the Ninth Circuit, in A&M Records,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc., characterized similar copying of music files as
commercial activity.72 Like Justice Souter in Campbell, Judge Beezer simply
ignored the contrary (and here, presumably binding) result reached in Sony.
Similarly, in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., Judge Newman
labeled duplication of scientific articles for research purposes simple or
"untransformed" copying. 73 Mimicking the language of the Ninth Circuit's
Sony decision, Judge Newman emphasized that "an untransformed copy is
likely to be used simply for the same intrinsic purpose as the original, thereby
providing limited justification for a finding of fair use."'74 Although Judge
Newman's consideration of the transformative-non-transformative nature of
the use was not improper-Sony clearly acknowledged that the dichotomy was
relevant 75 and Campbell had specifically emphasized that transformative uses
receive more favorable treatment under fair use 76 -Judge Newman's analysis
defense counsel in subsequent copyright cases should be bound by it. Nevertheless, since
the Court's allocation of the burden of proof in Campbell conflicted with its earlier
allocation in Sony, district and appellate courts have set about the task of reconciling the
conflicting decisions. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Serv., 99 F.3d
1381, 1385-86 (6th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (following Sony and assigning burden of proof to
plaintiff in cases involving non-commercial fair use, and following Campbell and assigning
burden of proof to defendant in commercial fair use cases), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156,
1156 (1997).
7' See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.33 (1984)
(rejecting the notion that consumptive use of time-shifting technology is commercial).
72 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (9th Cir. 2001). The district court ruled that Napster users were
engaged in commercial activities because "(1) 'a host user sending a file cannot be said to
engage in a personal use when distributing that file to an anonymous requester' and (2)
'Napster users get for free something they would ordinarily have to buy."' Id. (citing A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). The Ninth Circuit
affirmed on a clearly erroneous standard. Id.
73 60 F.3d 913, 922-24 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005, 1005 (1995)
(finding infringement when defendant corporation copied a number of scientific articles for
use in a scientific research archive).
74 Id. at 923; see also id at 923 n.9 (providing support for the notion that when copied
material is put to the "same intrinsic" use as the original it should not be a fair use); accord
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1981) ("If an alleged
infringer has reproduced a copyrighted work to use it for its intrinsic purpose, fair use has
not generally been applied .... Since the copies made by home videorecording are used for
the same purpose as the original, a finding of fair use is not justified.")
75 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (pointing out that the distinction between
"productive" and "unproductive uses" is an important consideration, "but it cannot be
wholly determinative").
76 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79 ("[T]he more transformative the new work, the less
will be the significance of other factors ... that may weigh against a finding of fair use.").
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came perilously close to insinuating that only productive or transformative
uses can be fair uses, an approach that the Court had expressly rejected eleven
years earlier in Sony.77 Moreover and somewhat curiously, Judge Newman
labeled Texaco's copying of scientific articles for the purpose of scientific
research "unproductive. '78  Yet, the Sony Court identified as a "clearly
productive" use an analogous case of "[a] teacher who copies to prepare
lecture notes. '79
More generally, as copyrighted works have moved increasingly toward
interactive digital distribution, the market failure approach argues for an
increasingly reduced role for fair use.80  With interactive digital and its
associated digital rights management technologies, transaction costs associated
with licensing particular uses, at least in theory, can be sharply reduced. A
copyright owner can build fees for particular uses into copying technologies
and thereby eliminate the potential for a transaction-costs-based market failure.
If the private markets that copyright creates are presumptively efficient, as
invocation of a market failure argument necessarily suggests, then as market
mechanisms develop (or will be led to develop by a finding of infringement),
these market mechanisms should displace fair use.
C. Choosing the Proper Fair Use Approach: The Economics of Public
Goods
In comparing these two interpretations of Sony, the differences are readily
apparent. Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens embraced an approach that
focused on balancing the competing public interests at stake in a particular
factual scenario. Aside from the Court's dicta regarding commercial uses of a
77 See supra notes 34, 75 (noting the Sony Court's rejection of "productive use" as being
wholly determinative). Moreover, even the Ninth Circuit had acknowledged that copying
for purposes of scientific and medical research was productive. See Universal City Studios,
659 F.2d at 970-71 (noting that the fair use photocopying of scientific and medical articles
in Williams & Wilkins Co. v United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff'd, 420 U.S.
376 (1975), is "clearly distinguishable" because of the "serious damage to medical science
that would result [according to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals] if it held for the
plaintiff').
78 Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 922-24 (noting that the duplicate "is likely to be
used simply for the same intrinsic purpose as the original").
79 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 (adding that a teacher who copies material in an
effort to further his or her specialized knowledge is also productive). Thus, according to the
Court, a claim of fair use is advanced equally by productive activity that benefits the public
and by productive activities that benefit the individual. See id.
10 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use v. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REv. 557, 581 (1998)
(describing how the fared use of commercial on-line services and other databases can
provide "more and better verified, organized, and interlinked information, at less cost, than
fair use does now").
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work,8' the Court rejected bright-line rules, per se categories, or other
presumptions as the means for resolving the fair use issue. Instead, the Court
placed the burden on the copyright owner to demonstrate, in a realistic and
concrete way, that the use at issue threatens the public's interest in additional
works sufficiently to outweigh the public benefits derived from the use
directly. In contrast, the market failure approach relies on a presumption of
market efficiency drawn from economic analysis of private goods. By starting
with an assumption that private markets are efficient, the market failure
approach shifts the burden to the defendant to establish the existence of market
failure as a threshold matter. Only where market failure is likely to occur
should a court consider intervening into the otherwise (presumptively) efficient
operation of the market for copyrighted works.82 Moreover, even where a
defendant successfully establishes a market failure, the strong preference for
market outcomes and the distrust of government intervention (that fair use, but
not copyright itself, somehow represents) remain, limiting the availability of
the fair use "defense." Given the strong preference for market outcomes
inherent in the market failure approach, proof of neither actual harm nor
probable harm should be required to defeat a claim of fair use. So long as a
copyright plaintiff can show "a potential for harm," then given the presumptive
efficiency of private markets inherent in a market failure approach, fair use
should be denied. 83
Given these differences, the Sony Court's rationale is fundamentally
incompatible with the market failure approach, and a choice must be made as
to which interpretation to follow. For courts, one might have thought that
following the Court's own interpretation of its decision was required by the
very nature of judicial authority. Yet, even if we were free to choose between
these interpretations, the Court's balancing approach better reflects our present
economic understanding of the efficiency of markets associated with the
private production of copyrighted works.
81 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449, 451 ("If the Betamax were used to make copies for a
commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would be presumptively unfair .... Thus,
although every commercial use of copyrighted material is presumptively an unfair
exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the owner of the copyright, non-
commercial uses are a different matter.").
82 As the Court explained in Harper & Row:
Economists who have addressed the issue believe the fair use exception should come
into play only in those situations in which the market fails or the price the copyright
holder would ask is near zero .... As the facts here demonstrate, there is a fully
functioning market that encourages the creation and dissemination of memoirs of
public figures. In the economists' view, permitting "fair use" to displace normal
copyright channels disrupts the copyright market without a commensurate public
benefit.
Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 n.9 (1985) (citing Gordon,
supra note 2, at 1615).
83 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 482 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (acknowledging the impact
infringements, seemingly minor in isolation, can have when compounded over time).
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The central difficulty with the market failure account, from an economic
perspective, is that it fails to account adequately for the fact that copyrighted
works are public, not private, goods. Although Professor Gordon recognizes
this, she argues that of the two characteristics commonly associated with
public goods, nonrivalrous consumption and an inability to exclude non-
payers, 84 copyright addresses the "more important" characteristic by
"providing a means for excluding nonpurchasers. ' '8 5  Because it enables
copyright owners to exclude non-payers, copyright, Professor Gordon insists,
"allows a market for intellectual property to function" despite the public good
nature of copyrighted works.86 Having rendered the property rights that
copyright creates in works of authorship essentially equivalent to those
associated with private goods more generally, Professor Gordon then looks to
limitations on property rights generally, such as the doctrines of excuse and
justification, to suggest fair use's proper scope-an approach that she repeats
in a more recent article revisiting the fair use issue. 87
Yet, such an approach misses the point almost entirely. For private goods,
there are any number of transactions that, in theory, could prove welfare
enhancing. In the absence of transaction costs, welfare effects, offer-asking
asymmetries, and the other market imperfections that Professor Gordon cites,
one could well imagine farmers making their unused land available for
temporary residents or commuters renting their automobiles to others outside
of commute times. Yet, there is nothing like copyright's fair use doctrine in
real or personal property law. Excuse and justification offer limited exceptions
to private property's "sole and despotic dominion, '88 but only in cases of strict
necessity. Neither doctrine would, for example, allow someone to squat on a
farmer's land or to borrow another's car simply because transaction costs (or
some other cause of market failure) might otherwise preclude theoretically
desirable transactions. 89 Excuse and justification are far more limited with
84 Although legal commentators are prone to defining "public" goods as goods that are
characterized by: (1) nonrivalrous consumption, and (2) an inability to exclude non-payers,
in truth, only the first is required. See, e.g., William H. Oakland, Theory of Public Goods, in
2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIc EcoNoMIcs 486 (A.J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein eds., 1987).
85 Gordon, supra note 2, at 1612 (noting that an author retains legal control over
reproduction and certain other uses of her work).
86 See id. at 1612. Professor Gordon has complained that courts and commentators have
erroneously equated her position with a view that so long as transaction costs were not so
high as to prevent the parties from striking a bargain in the form of a license, fair use should
be denied. See Gordon II, supra note 48, at 2 n.2; see also Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining
the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J.
INTEL. PROP. L. 1, 26-27 (1997). However, her argument that the ability to exclude non-
payers alone is sufficient to invoke the presumptive efficiency of private markets seems to
invite precisely such an interpretation.
87 See Gordon II, supra note 48.
88 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2.
89 Many of the causes of market failure on which Professor Gordon relies in developing
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respect to private goods precisely because consumption of private goods is
inherently rivalrous and therefore fundamentally incompatible with anything
like copyright's fair use doctrine. If a commuter happened to need her car
unexpectedly during the day, someone else's borrowing would not only reduce
the value of the car to its owner; it would render the car owner physically
unable to make her intended use. With private goods, allowing one use
necessarily precludes any other.
In contrast, with copyrighted works, no such rivalry arises. One party can
use her copy of a work without any affect on the physical ability of another to
use his copy of the same work. This lack of physical rivalry is both the
defining difference between copyrighted works and more traditional private
goods, and the essential justification for the fair use doctrine. Attempting to
define fair use's proper scope without placing the nonrivalrous nature of
copyrighted works at the center of the analysis is virtually certain to suggest an
inherently flawed and unjustifiably restrictive approach to the fair use issue.
In terms of economic analysis, Professor Gordon's suggestion that
addressing the issue of excludability is alone sufficient to ensure an efficient
market for copyrighted works is simply wrong. Even if copyright law enabled
a copyright owner to exclude non-payers perfectly, the ability to exclude
would not establish the efficiency of the resulting markets. So long as
consumption of works of authorship remains nonrivalrous-that is, so long as
"one man's consumption does not reduce some other man's consumption" 90
-
the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics does not apply. As a
result, even if the assumptions necessary for the theorem's application are
otherwise satisfied, a competitive equilibrium through private markets will not
generally achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of copyrighted works or the
resources necessary to create them.91
As economists have recognized, using a system of exclusive rights, such as
copyright, to ensure an appropriate supply of a public good through private
markets creates a Catch-22 situation. 92 In the absence of copyright, if markets
were perfectly competitive, there would be no economic incentive to produce
her theory of fair use were previously explored by Professors Michelman and Kennedy in
the context of private property regimes governing private goods. See Frank H. Michelman
& Duncan Kennedy, Are Property and Contract Efficient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 711, 715-38,
758-68 (1980); see also Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8
HoFSTRA L. REV. 509, 524-25 (1980) (discussing offer-asking asymmetries and wealth
effects).
90 Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. STAT. 387,
387 (1954) (labeling such goods "collective consumption goods").
91 See, e.g., Oakland, supra note 84, at 515-22.
92 Private markets will sometimes work efficiently for the creation of private clubs,
despite the public good nature of the club facilities vis-A-vis club members, where the
presence of congestion externalities from additional members can be used as the price for
admission and the resulting fees can be used to finance construction of the facility. See,
e.g., id. at 503-07.
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works of authorship. 93 When a new work was introduced, competitors would
instantly copy it, price would be driven to the marginal cost of additional
copies, and the work's author would receive no economic profit or rent to
cover her initial authorship costs. Given the absence of an economic incentive
to produce such works, too few works would be created. In the absence of
copyright, perfectly competitive private markets would not therefore ensure an
optimal allocation of resources. On the other hand, if we grant the author a
legal right to prohibit unauthorized copying, thereby enabling her to set a price
for her copies somewhat above their marginal cost, then the author will earn
some economic rent and have a corresponding incentive to create the work.
However, absent an ability to price discriminate perfectly, 94 pricing above
marginal cost will deny some consumers access to the work, creating a
deadweight welfare loss. Because of this deadweight loss, private markets for
copyrighted works will also fail to achieve a Pareto optimal allocation of
resources.
95
Attempting to encourage private market production of works of authorship
through legal restrictions on copying thus leads inevitably to market failure.
Whether we narrow fair use and prohibit unauthorized copying somewhat
more generally, or broaden fair use and allow somewhat more unauthorized
copying, the resulting private market outcomes will not be Pareto optimal. We
will either have too little new authorship or too little access to existing works
(or perhaps some mixture of both).96 As Professor Kenneth Arrow has
explained in the analogous patent context: "In a free enterprise economy,
inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create property rights;
93 Cf F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
444 (2d ed. 1980) ("If pure and perfect competition in the strictest sense prevailed
continuously.., incentives for invention and innovation would be fatally defective without
a patent system or some equivalent substitute.").
94 For a discussion of the issues raised by price discrimination in copyright generally, see
Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799 (2000); Wendy J.
Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1367 (1998); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright and the Supposed Efficiency of
First-Degree Price Discrimination (unpublished manuscript, available upon request).
95 Curiously, although market power and the associated costs of monopoly represent one
of the most important and well-known instances of market failure, Professor Gordon omits
market power from her list of circumstances where markets are likely to fail. See Gordon,
supra note 2, at 1607-08 (identifying high transaction costs, externalities, and lack of perfect
knowledge as causes of market failure). Although Professor Gordon in her more recent
work on the issue goes to the very fringes of economic analysis (and beyond) for arguments
that will allow her to label as instances of market failure all of the cases that she believes
should constitute fair use, she continues to omit market power from her list. See Gordon II,
supra note 48, at 15, 30-42 (arguing that non-market norms may establish market failure).
96 One of the more important, yet as far as I know unremarked, aspects of copyright law
is that we are, in some sense, trading restrictions on access and higher prices for the works
we really want in order to ensure financing for works that we really do not want.
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precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the
information. 97
Because of the public good character of copyrighted works, the private
rights that copyrights creates will lead inevitably to market failure. Because
market failure is inevitable, the concept of market failure cannot serve as a
useful guide in determining which uses of a copyrighted work should be fair
and which uses unfair, or as Justice Souter has expressed the issue, in
separating "the fair use sheep from the infringing goats. '98 Moreover, existing
economic analysis suggests no reason to presume, as a market failure approach
necessarily does, that private markets will necessarily, or even usually, prove
efficient at ensuring adequate supply and dissemination of copyrighted works.
Rather, what economic analysis seems to require is precisely the sort of
balancing that Justice Stevens embraced in Sony. In applying the fair use
doctrine, courts must balance what the public has to gain and what it has to
lose from prohibiting the use at issue.
II. A BALANCING OF PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE REAL ECONOMICS OF FAIR USE
In the United States, copyright is public-minded. The primary purpose of
copyright is neither to protect the natural or moral rights of authors nor to
reward copyright owners. Rather, copyright's primary purpose is to ensure the
public an adequate supply of copyrighted works. In Justice Douglas's words:
The copyright law, like the patent statutes, makes reward to the owner a
secondary consideration. In Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127,
Chief Justice Hughes spoke as follows respecting the copyright monopoly
granted by Congress, "The sole interest of the United States and the
primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general benefits
derived by the public from the labors of authors." It is said that reward to
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of
his creative genius. 99
So long as copyright is public-minded, then fair use must, given the public
good character of copyrighted works, entail a balancing of the public benefits
and losses associated with granting the copyright owner the right to prohibit
particular uses.
Congress expressly embraced a balancing approach in its codification of the
fair use doctrine. 00 Although it adopted the four factors set forth in section
9' Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 617 (1962).
98 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1995) (Souter, J.).
99 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948), quoted with
approval in Sony Corp. v. Universal Pictures Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
'oo See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85 (drawing on a House Report and reasoning from
Sony to determine that the character of a work is one factor to be weighed against others);
Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 455 n.40 ("Congress has plainly instructed us that fair use analysis
calls for a sensitive balancing of interests.")
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107 as considerations that may prove relevant in particular cases, Congress did
not intend the four factors to serve as a checklist or magic formula for the
correct resolution of a fair use question.10 1  Moreover, as Justice Souter
recognized in Campbell, courts developed the four statutory factors in the first
half of the nineteenth century 0 2 against a particular statutory and technological
background. At that time, the printing press was essentially the only
technology available for reproducing a copyrighted work, and given that
technology, the question of infringement arose almost exclusively when a
second, competing printer published a later work that incorporated, to a greater
or lesser extent, material from an earlier copyrighted work. 103  Such
transformative, but potentially competing, reuse was the only type of
infringement the technology of that time made possible; the technology that
today enables private or routine copying for later use was not yet available.
Given the limits of nineteenth century technology, the question of fair use
arose, and courts developed the four fair use factors to address the competing
public interests at stake, in one particular type of case: a second author's
potentially transformative reuse of materials from an earlier work. In this
particular context, the value added by the second author's work and the extent
to which similarities will necessarily arise or borrowings necessarily occur
given the shared subject matter, must be balanced against the need to ensure
the original author a reasonable opportunity to earn a fair return on her creative
investment. Out of the attempt to do so, courts developed the four fair use
factors that Justice Story summarized in Folsom v. Marsh: "In short, we must
often, in deciding questions of this sort, look to the nature and objects of the
10t See, e.g., Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584-85.
102 Id. at 576 (citing Justice Story's 1841 opinion in Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342
(C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), as "distill[ing] the essence of [fair use] law and
methodology" and noting that the 1976 Copyright Act codifies "Justice Story's summary"
of the doctrine).
'03 See Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10-11 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (applying fair use doctrine
in a case involving alleged infringement of plaintiff's physiognomy text by defendant's
subsequent text on the same subject); Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60-61 (C.C. Mass.
1869) (No. 8,136) (applying fair use doctrine in a case involving alleged infringement of an
earlier work when defendants later published an updated edition); Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas.
1113, 1116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 4,095) (applying fair use in a case involving alleged
infringement of plaintiff's dress-cutting chart by defendant's later dress-cutting guide);
Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1134 (C.C. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,763) (applying fair use
doctrine in a case involving alleged infringement of plaintiff's book on grammar by
defendant's subsequent book on same subject); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 625 (C.C.
Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (applying fair use doctrine in a case involving alleged infringement
of plaintiffs book on introductory arithmetic by defendant's book on same subject); Folsom
v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (applying fair use doctrine in a
case involving alleged infringement of plaintiff's twelve-volume work, entitled the Writings
of President Washington, by defendant's subsequent two-volume work, entitled The Life of
Washington).
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selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in
which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the
objects, of the original work."' 0 4
However, even in the transformative use context where the factors were
developed, the four factors were at best rough proxies for the balance of
competing public interests that must ultimately guide application of the fair use
doctrine. When we move to cases outside of the particular historical and
technological context of the nineteenth century, restricting the analysis to these
four factors may prove affirmatively misleading, as it did for the Ninth Circuit
in Sony. Moreover, we must take care not to substitute historical coincidence
for a reasoned and careful analysis of the competing public interests at stake in
any given case. Limiting fair use to cases involving productive or
transformative uses on the grounds that fair use in the past "'has always had to
do with the use by a second author of a first author's work,' ' ' 10 5 mistakes the
historical limits of technology for sound public policy. 106
As we move increasingly beyond the technological limits of the nineteenth
century and encounter uses other than the one at issue at that time, the specific
factors developed in the nineteenth century become increasingly outdated, and
a more general approach to the fair use issue becomes appropriate. 0 7 In an
ideal world with perfect information, courts could resolve the fair use issue by
determining precisely the social value of additional authorship resulting from
104 9 F. Cas. at 348; see also Simms, 75 F. at 9-10; Lawrence, 15 F. Cas. at 60-61; Drury,
7 F. Cas. at 1116; Greene, 10 F. Cas. at 1134; Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 625.
105 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981)
(quoting LEON SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN COPYRIGHT 24 (1978)) (emphasis in
original), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
106 In Harper & Row, the plaintiffs advanced a similarly fallacious argument when they
insisted that statutory fair use had historically been limited to published works. 471 U.S.
539, 550-52 (1985). Of course, it had. Prior to the 1976 Act, publication was a prerequisite
for statutory copyright. See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 10 (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 410 (2000)) ("Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his
work by publication .. "). As a result, prior to January 1, 1978, neither statutory
protection, nor presumably statutory fair use, applied to unpublished works. It was therefore
inevitable that the initial application of statutory fair use to unpublished works would arise
only after the 1976 Act changed the prerequisite for the attachment of statutory copyright
protection from publication to fixation. Rather than recognize this simple fact, the Harper
& Row Court hypothesized an alternative, substantive justification for the historical limits of
fair use. See Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc., 471 U.S. at 550-51 ("Perhaps because the fair use
doctrine was predicated on the author's implied consent to 'reasonable and customary' use
when he released his work for public consumption, fair use traditionally was not recognized
as a defense to charges of copying from an author's as yet unpublished works.").
07 As Congress noted in the legislative history accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act,
the statutory codification of the four factors was not intended to freeze the doctrine in the
statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at
65 (1976). Instead, Congress left the courts to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a
case-by-case basis. Id. at 66.
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prohibiting a use and then comparing that value to the social value of allowing
the use to continue.108 Although striking such an ideal balance in every case
remains beyond the reach of our current legal and economic understanding, we
can come considerably closer to the ideal balance by examining the competing
public interests directly, rather than by continuing to rely on the four
nineteenth century factors. On one side of the balance, attention should be
directed toward the extent to which prohibiting a particular use will lead to
more and better works of authorship by asking: (1) whether the unauthorized
use would otherwise reduce the revenue associated with the copyrighted work;
and (2) if so, how, if at all, that reduction would likely affect the production of
copyrighted works. 0 9 On the other side of the balance, we must consider what
the public stands to lose if the use is prohibited. Once the competing interests
have been identified, balancing those interests directly should provide a clearer
picture of whether a particular use improves social welfare and hence should
be considered fair, or reduces social welfare and hence should be considered
infringing.
Justice Stevens's opinion in Sony opened the door to such a direct balancing
approach. Refusing to accord controlling or otherwise undue weight to the
four nineteenth century factors codified in section 107,110 Justice Stevens
108 As part of this balance, we should also consider the value of the uses to which the
available resources would otherwise be devoted if not devoted to the creation of additional
works. As William Baxter argued:
Innovative activity should be subsidized as much and no more than is necessary to
attract to that activity those inputs which, if invested in any other activity, would yield
a product of lesser social value .... [T]he question of how much subsidy is desirable
could only be answered by a controlled experiment that would permit measurement of
the social value of innovative output and of unsubsidized alternative outputs at each of
a series of subsidy levels. Any such experiment is well beyond the reach of present
techniques.
Baxter, supra note 8, at 268-69.
109 In Sony, the district court properly recognized that harm to the potential value of a
copyrighted work should not be decided in the abstract, but in terms of the threat to the
work's creation:
Before proceeding to a discussion of these factors, the court notes that the extent of the
harm which plaintiffs ask the court to assume is probable is unclear. Harm which
"imperils the existence of a publication" is more destructive of a fair use defense than
is harm which would "limit profits." Plaintiffs' experts have testified that if Betamax
is not enjoined, their profits will decrease, and that for some programs, they may not
recoup their production costs. If this happens, plaintiffs warn, they will have to reduce
the quality, or at least the production costs, of their audiovisual works. Plaintiffs have
not said that they will no longer be able to produce this material.
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429, 452 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (citation
omitted), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
110 Justice Stevens allocated only four sentences in his entire majority opinion to the first
three statutory fair use factors:
Although not conclusive, the first factor requires that "the commercial or nonprofit
character of an activity" be weighed in any fair use decision. If the Betamax were used
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examined directly the competing public interests at stake.'" Unfortunately,
further development of Justice Stevens's approach was cut short by the
reinterpretation of Sony as an exceptional case of market failure. It is only
fitting then that we return to the issue of time-shifting as the first step in
illustrating the proper application of Justice Stevens's balancing approach and
restoring the true reach of Sony's understanding of fair use.
A. The Relationship Between Unauthorized Use and Incentives: The
Example of Time-Shifting
As a first step in the balancing approach, a court must determine whether the
copyright owner has shown "by a preponderance of the evidence that some
meaningful likelihood of [actual or] future harm [to the work's market value]
exists." 2  On this issue alone, the fairness of some uses can be readily
resolved. When a use is not one the copyright owner would otherwise license
or engage in, and where the use does not interfere with a market that the
copyright owner would otherwise exploit, there is no public interest in
allowing the copyright owner to exclude others from the use. As a result, the
use should be fair per se." 3 Cases become more difficult when the use is one
whose economic value the copyright owner would like to capture. Even in
these more difficult cases, we must, as the Sony Court admonished, not
substitute presumptions, conclusory labels, or the invocation of private good
analogies for a careful examination of the evidence presented.1 4 Too often in
fair use analyses, courts and commentators leap from the fact that some
consumers are obtaining unauthorized access to the conclusion that such free
riding will necessarily impair the incentives for creating the work.1 5 Yet, free
to make copies for a commercial or profit-making purpose, such use would
presumptively be unfair. The contrary presumption is appropriate here, however,
because the District Court's findings plainly establish that time-shifting for private
home use must be characterized as a non-commercial, nonprofit activity. Moreover,
when one considers the nature of a televised copyrighted audiovisual work, see 17
U.S.C. § 107(2) (1982 ed.), and that time-shifting merely enables a viewer to see such a
work which he had been invited to witness in its entirety free of charge, the fact that the
entire work is reproduced, see § 107(3), does not have its ordinary effect of militating
against a finding of fair use.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-50 (1984) (footnotes
omitted).
See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 431-32, 450-56.
d2 . at 451.
13 The Court came close to adopting such a position in its analysis of the fourth statutory
fair use factor in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591-94 (1994)
(discussing how a parody will not supercede the original because it has a different market
function).
".. See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 450 n.33 (rejecting proffered analogy to theft of private
goods).
115 See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 2, at 1611 ("Because it is difficult or expensive to
prevent 'free riders' from using such goods, public goods usually will be under-produced if
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riding on a public good is not analogous to theft of a private good and can
indeed prove Pareto optimal. 116 Nevertheless, copyright owners continue to
rely on the free rider argument hoping that courts will not adequately explore
the underlying economics at issue.
For example, in the recently filed Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV,
Inc.,"17 the plaintiffs sued ReplayTV alleging contributory and vicarious
copyright infringement based upon ReplayTV's marketing of the ReplayTV
4000. Like the Betamax before it, the keplayTV allows home taping of
television programs. Although Sony would seem to control, the plaintiffs
attempt to distinguish Sony on the grounds that the ReplayTV's "AutoSkip"
feature "automatically eliminates commercials during playback.""l 8 In Sony,
the district court specifically found that only 25% of Betamax consumers fast-
forwarded through commercials.' 19' Because of the ReplayTV's AutoSkip
feature, the plaintiffs allege that no ReplayTV consumer will watch
commercials during playback. 120 Advertisers, the complaint continues, will
not pay for advertisements that consumers do not watch.' 2 ' The ReplayTV
4000 therefore poses a far more serious threat to a copyrighted television
program's advertising revenues than did the Betamax, or so the plaintiffs
contend. 12
2
Because of the factual finding that most Betamax time-shifters were
left to the private market.").
116 As I have shown elsewhere, if we follow the usual assumptions that a copyright
owner faces a downward sloping, linear demand curve and constant marginal costs, then to
optimize her profits, the copyright owner will set a price such that,
for every consumer who willingly pays the copyright owner's price, there is another
who would have paid the work's competitive price, but who is unwilling to pay the
supra-competitive price the copyright owner is charging. Because these consumers are
unwilling to pay the copyright owner's [supra-competitive] price in any event, the
copyright owner would see no reduction in her revenue, ceteris paribus, even if every
one of them obtained an unauthorized copy of the work through private copying.
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 866-67 (2001).
117 Complaint, Paramount Pictures Corp. v. ReplayTV, Inc., (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 31,
2001) (No. 01-09358), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/Paramount_vReplayTV/
200110301 complaint.pdf (last visited Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter Paramount Complaint].
1I See id. 10-13. The plaintiffs also distinguish Sony on the grounds that the
ReplayTV 4000 allows sharing of recorded programs over the Internet with other ReplayTV
4000 consumers. Id. 14.
119 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 452 n.36.
120 Paramount Complaint, supra note 117, TT 7, 11, 12.
121 Id. T 7 ("Advertisers will not pay to have their advertisements placed within television
programming delivered to viewers when the advertisements will be invisible to those
viewers.").
122 Id. ("[T]he AutoSkip feature would fundamentally and inevitably erode the means by




watching the embedded commercials, Sony is technically distinguishable.
Moreover, as the Sony Court itself recognized in its analysis of the fourth fair
use factor, television programs are, in truth, not offered to viewers "without
charge."' 23 Rather, television broadcasters "charge" viewers for watching
copyrighted television programs by embedding commercials in their
broadcasts. Time-shifting without watching the commercials thus represents a
paradigm case of free riding. Time-shifters value the television programs they
tape at more than their pro rata share of the programs' costs, and so are willing
to pay, but are able to avoid doing so because of the difficulties of collecting
the payment. Yet if we refuse to allow the free rider label to control the
analysis and examine the underlying economics instead, as Sony instructs, we
find that such time-shifting is likely to remain Pareto optimal for the types of
time-shifting common today. Through a more careful analysis, we can also
better define the circumstances where this type of free riding will begin to
reduce copyrighted television programs' associated advertising revenues.
In order to understand the economic consequences of time-shifting, we must
first understand the economics of advertising. At the simplest level,
advertisers pay to have their commercials included in television programs
because they believe that their commercials will influence consumer-
purchasing decisions and increase either the sales of, or the price that can be
charged for, the advertised product or service. Although the precise manner in
which advertising influences consumer spending is not yet fully understood,
economists have identified three general mechanisms through which
advertising can influence consumer spending.' 24 First, advertising can provide
relevant information on product qualities, characteristics or prices-
information that was previously unknown to the consumer. 25 Consumers can
use this information to make more rational decisions regarding which goods
and services to purchase.
"2 Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449-50, 454. Like the television industry, the Sony Court was
using "free" or "without charge" to distinguish broadcast television from pay-per-view or
subscription services. But cf Paramount Complaint, supra note 117, 7 ("Defendants'
unlawful scheme attacks the fundamental economic underpinnings of free television and
basic nonbroadcast services and, hence, the means by which plaintiffs' copyrighted works
are paid for." (emphasis added)).
124 See, e.g., Richard E. Caves & David P. Greene, Brands' Quality Levels, Prices, and
Advertising Outlays: Empirical Evidence on Signals and Information Costs, 14 INT'L J.
INDUS. ORG. 29, 34 (1996); Isaac Ehrlich & Lawrence Fisher, The Derived Demand for
Advertising: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 366 (1982);
Louis Thomas, Scott Shane & Keith Weigelt, An Empirical Examination ofAdvertising as a
Signal of Product Quality, 37 J. ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 415 (1998).
125 See George J. Stigler, The Economics ofInformation, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 220-24
(1961) (setting forth notion of consumer search costs and arguing that advertising can
reduce those search costs); see also Lee Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of
Eyeglasses, 15 J.L. & ECON. 337, 349-50 (1972) (demonstrating that price advertising
reduced the market price for eyeglasses).
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Second, advertising can serve as a signal of product or service quality. As a
signal, the very fact that a given company advertises is itself suggestive of the
likely quality of the company's associated product or service.126 At least for
repeat purchase goods, advertising will usually prove more profitable for a
firm with a high quality product than for a firm with a low quality product.
Consider a market with two firms, one with a high quality product and one
with a low quality product. If consumers are initially unaware of the
differences in product quality between the goods, and both firms advertise at
similar levels, the advertisements are likely to attract similar numbers of initial
purchases. However, after purchasing the goods, consumers will learn directly
the quality of the good purchased. If a consumer purchased a good that turned
out to be low quality or otherwise unsatisfactory, the consumer is unlikely to
purchase the same good again. By contrast, the consumer who purchased a
good that turned out to be high quality or otherwise a good value for the price
will likely purchase the same good again. Therefore, there is a somewhat
greater likelihood of repeat purchasers for high quality goods, and advertising
should prove more profitable for the firm with the high quality good, ceteris
paribus. To the extent advertising is more profitable for the high quality firm,
we should expect the high quality firm to advertise more. Consumers can
therefore rely on the extent of a company's advertising as a signal of the
advertised product's quality, at least under certain assumptions.'
27
Third, advertising can seek to influence consumer purchasing by shaping
126 See Phillip Nelson, Advertising as Information, 82 J. POL. ECON. 729, 732 (1974).
Nelson argued that:
The miniscule amount of direct information from advertising for experience qualities
gives the consumer an incentive to extract any conceivable indirect information that
would help. Such indirect information is available from advertising. The consumer
can learn that the brand advertises .... Their total informational role ... is simply
contained in their existence. The consumer believes that the more a brand advertises,
the more likely it is to be a better buy.
Id. Compare Thomas, Shane & Weigelt, supra note 124, at 425-26 (finding empirical
support for signaling function) with Caves & Greene, supra note 124, at 50 (finding no
empirical support for signaling function).
127 To the extent a firm earns a higher rent on each unit sold, advertising would prove
more profitable for the firm even if it generates fewer repeat purchasers. Thus, advertising
for a drug still under patent protection may prove more profitable than advertising for a drug
no longer under patent protection, even if the still-patented drug is less effective. In such a
case, the fact of advertising may be a misleading signal of product quality. See Daniel Q.
Haney, Doctors Ignoring Older, Better Heart Drugs, Studies Say, DENVER POST, Mar. 21,
1998, at A6 (noting that extensive advertising and promotional expenditures on newer heart
drugs still protected by patent led to increased usage of such drugs even though studies had
shown that they were less effective than older, no-longer patented drugs); Linda Villarosa,
Ads and Doctors' Drug Choices: A Link?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1999, at F8 (noting that
researchers believe that marketing efforts may have led doctors to switch to newer, costlier
drugs from older, established medications).
10032002]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W RE VIE W
consumer's preferences towards a particular brand or product. 128 This type of
advertising may play on a consumer's insecurities, seeking to assure the
consumer that he will be more attractive or popular, or simply happier should
he begin consuming a particular good or service. To be effective, this type of
advertisement may first need to heighten a consumer's insecurity about some
aspect of himself by holding up a standard of success or happiness or beauty
that is nearly impossible to achieve in ordinary life. 129 After heightening the
consumer's insecurities and disturbing his satisfaction, the advertisement can
offer the consumer a product or service that, if purchased, will restore the
consumer's satisfaction. Alternatively, an advertiser might consciously seek to
create a certain image for a brand or product and attempt to tie that marketing
image to some aspect of a consumer's preexisting self-image. 130 Although one
might be skeptical of the efficacy of these advertising approaches, image-
oriented advertising represents the dominant form of television advertising
today.
When we consider the economics of advertising as it relates to time-shifting,
one of the key issues is the relationship between increased exposure to
advertisements and increased consumer spending on advertised products. With
live television viewing, the relationship between increased television viewing
and increased exposure to advertisements is reasonably linear. Today, there is
an essentially constant ratio of ten minutes of advertisements and 50 minutes
of program content in each hour of television programming. Aside from
premium subscription or pay-per-view services, and the occasional trip to the
refrigerator, each hour spent watching television exposes an individual to ten
minutes of advertisements. Nevertheless, although the relationship between
time spent watching television and advertising exposure is reasonably linear,
the relationship between advertising exposure and consumer spending on
advertised products is probably not, for three reasons.
128 Professor Ralph S. Brown argued that such preference-shaping is wasteful and
anticompetitive because it creates artificial distinctions between otherwise identical
products. Ralph S. Brown, Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade
Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165, 1167-83 (1948); See also William M. Landes & Richard A.
Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & EcON. 265, 274-75 (1987)
(insisting that the correct economic model of trademarks is one where "trademarks lower
search costs and foster quality control rather than create social waste and consumer
deception"). More recent economic scholarship has suggested that there is nothing
inherently illegitimate about preference-shaping. See Phillip Nelson, The Economic
Consequences of Advertising, 48 J. Bus. 213, 213 (1975) ("We economists have no theory
of taste changes, so this approach leads to no behavioral predictions.").
129 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 420 n.212
(1999) (likening advertising that first heightens insecurity to blackmail).
130 See, e.g., Susan Fournier, Consumers and their Brands: Developing Relationship
Theory in Consumer Research, 24 J. CONSUMER RES. 343, 348-63 (1998) (exploring the
relationships that can develop between individuals, their self-identities, and their brand
preferences).
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First, although repeated exposure is probably important to an
advertisement's effectiveness, at some point, the effectiveness of an
advertisement at influencing consumer spending probably begins to diminish.
To some extent, the ability of an advertisement to maintain its effectiveness
over repeat exposures may depend upon the type of advertising at issue. If the
advertisement aims to provide the consumer with information that the
consumer did not otherwise have, a consumer's first exposure to the
advertisement is likely to be the most effective at influencing the consumer's
purchasing decisions. A second, third or fourth exposure to the same
informational advertisement may also prove influential, reminding or
reinforcing the information previously conveyed. At some point, however,
additional exposures will merely repeat information the consumer already has,
and, at that point, the marginal effectiveness of additional exposures is likely to
diminish sharply. For the signaling and preference shaping types of
advertisement, effectiveness probably also diminishes over repeated exposures,
although the logical argument for diminishing returns for these types of
advertisements is less clear-cut. Nevertheless, although some repetition is
again likely to strengthen or reinforce an advertisement's signaling or
preference shaping function, the fact remains that, in the end, the total quantity
of a particular good that a consumer will purchase has reasonably clear limits.
In any given day, there is only so much deodorant a consumer will use, only so
much soda a consumer will drink, and probably only one truck that the
consumer will drive to work. It may take a certain level of exposure to a
particular brand's message before a consumer will adopt that brand as her own.
However, once she has, further exposure may reinforce her commitment to the
brand, but it is unlikely to increase her purchases of the associated product
commensurately. 1 '
Second, in addition to a decreasing marginal influence on consumer
spending, additional exposure to advertisements entails an opportunity cost.
Time spent in front of the television watching commercials cannot be put to
other uses, including such productive activities as work or raising a family. To
take an extreme example, if a person spends all day watching television, the
person may be exposed to any number of advertisements and may wish to
purchase any number of the products so advertised. However, having spent all
day watching television, the person will have forgone the income she could
otherwise have used that time to earn and will therefore have less to spend on
the advertised products. This opportunity cost may vary depending on whether
a consumer is salaried or earns (or could earn) an hourly wage. For those
consumers who could have worked at an hourly wage during the time spent
'1 Otherwise, if the relationship between the number of exposures to an advertisement
and the consumer's spending on the advertised product remained linear, rather than
decreasing, then if a company found it profitable to advertise at all, the company would find
it profitable to advertise continuously. Yet companies do not, suggesting, as one would
expect, diminishing marginal returns from advertising investments.
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watching television, watching television reduces the consumer's income
available for purchasing advertised goods at a constant rate equal to the
available wage for each hour spent watching television. For those consumers
who hold a salaried position in return for a 40-hour week, there may be little or
no reduction in the income available for purchasing advertised goods so long
as the consumer keeps her television watching within reasonable bounds. Only
if the consumer allows television watching to interfere with his job (for
example, by repeatedly calling in sick to stay home and watch soap operas),
will television watching reduce the salaried consumer's disposable income.
Rather than face a linear opportunity cost, a salaried consumer may face little
or no opportunity cost for her initial television watching, but may then face a
very substantial opportunity cost should she expand her television watching
too much.
Third, an individual's expenditures on advertised goods and services
ultimately face a cap as they approach the limit of the individual's available
resources. Even with the capacity to finance additional purchases through
borrowing, consumers will, sooner or later, face a limit on how much they can
spend on advertised goods, no matter how persuasive the advertising. As they
approach that limit, watching additional commercials will not increase their
total spending on advertised products because they cannot afford additional
purchases.
When we combine advertising's diminishing marginal influence, its
increasing opportunity cost, and some ultimate limit on consumer spending, we
can obtain some sense for the ability of advertising to influence an average
consumer's spending as a function of a consumer's daily television viewing, as
shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1
Total Expenditure on Advertised Products
as a Function of Television Viewing
Daily Television Viewing
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As Figure 1 suggests, television advertising is likely to be most effective in
persuading the consumer to purchase the advertised products or services at low
levels of daily television viewing. As the consumer spends more time each
day watching television, some of the advertisements will conflict and cancel
out. Others will be repeated and marginal returns will diminish. Increased
time spent watching television and its attendant commercials also means an
increase in the consumer's opportunity cost, as time spent watching television
cannot be spent on gainful employment. Moreover, as spending on advertised
products increases, it will eventually approach the consumer's ultimate budget
constraint, limiting the potential for additional purchases. As a result, as a
consumer's daily television viewing increases, the marginal expenditures on
advertised goods will decrease. Eventually, the increasing opportunity costs of
watching additional television will exceed the marginal influence of the
additional commercials, and, at that point, additional time spent watching
television will actually begin to reduce a consumer's spending on the
advertised products.
Given this relationship between time spent watching television and
expenditures on advertised products, a consumer's total spending on advertised
products may remain constant even if she manages to avoid some commercials
through time-shifting. So long as the consumer continues to watch enough live
television to maintain her advertising exposure at a sufficient level, the
consumer will continue to spend the same amount on advertised goods. For
example, a consumer who was initially watching sufficient television to be at
point A in Figure 1, might substitute considerable time-shifting for live
viewing without affecting her spending on advertised products, as the shift
from A to A 'in Figure 1 depicts. Even a consumer who was initially watching
relatively little television might substitute some time-shifting for live viewing
without reducing her spending on advertised products, as the shift from B to B'
reflects. Given that the average U.S. working man between the ages of 25 and
64 spent 12.7 hours per week watching television in 1981,132 some limited
substitution of time-shifting for live viewing is unlikely to reduce significantly
a consumer's total spending on advertised products.
One might argue, however, as the Paramount Pictures Corp. plaintiffs have
alleged, that even if the consumer's total spending on advertising remains
constant, no part of a ReplayTV consumer's spending will go towards products
advertised on those programs that she time-shifts because she will use the
AutoSkip feature to avoid the embedded commercials on those programs. 33
132 F. Thomas Juster & Frank P. Stafford, The Allocation of Time: Empirical Findings,
Behavioral Models, and Problems of Measurement, 29 J. EcoN. LIT. 471, 474, 475 tbl.1
(1991); see also Cherry Norton, Nation of TV Addicts Watch for Longer Than They Work,
THE INDEPENDENT, May 19, 2000, at 5 (noting that in Britain "the average person spends 25
hours a week watching television").
133 Cf Paramount Complaint, supra note 117, 7, 10-12 (arguing that advertisers will
not pay to have their ads delivered to viewers who are not watching).
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Whatever the consumer may spend on advertised products would go
elsewhere, presumably towards the products advertised on those programs that
the ReplayTV consumer continues to watch live. As a result, whether she is
counted in the broadcast audience of the program that she time-shifts or not,
134
the program's advertisers will not earn any sales revenue from the time-
shifting consumer and should, if the advertising market is reasonably
efficient, 35 refuse to pay the broadcaster for the time-shifting consumer. 36
Time-shifting thus appears to represent a paradigm case of free riding. If
free riding were per se inefficient and economically equivalent to theft, such
free riding would threaten directly the incentives necessary to ensure the
program's creation, and under the market failure approach, the government
should intervene to restore the appropriate level of incentives. Such
intervention might take the form of establishing a regime of exclusive rights
that would effectively require individually-negotiated licenses for time-
shifting. More realistically, if the transaction costs associated with individual
licenses are likely to prove prohibitively expensive, then the government
should impose a system of levies on copying equipment and tapes to
compensate copyright owners for whatever revenue they may lose as the result
of time-shifting. 1
37
13 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 452 n.36 (1984) (noting
that there was testimony at trial that Nielsen Ratings could measure Betamax viewership).
131 As the Court noted in Sony, evidence before the district court suggested that the
ability to measure audiences for particular television shows was not precise. See id. at 452
("'Most of plaintiffs' predictions of harm hinge on speculation about patterns and ratings, a
measurement system which Sydney Sheinberg, MCA's president, calls a "black art" because
of the significant level of imprecision involved in the calculations."' (quoting Universal City
Studios v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp. 429, 469 (C.D. Cal. 1979))).
136 See Paramount Complaint, supra note 117, 7, 13
137 Widely embraced in Europe, levies can enable copyright owners to collect a fee for
time-shifting without undue transaction costs, thereby overcoming the market failure
otherwise encountered in attempting to license time-shifting. See Federal Law on Copyright
in Works of Literature and Art and on Related Rights § 42b BGBI 111/1936 (Aus.),
available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID AT 091) (last visited Aug. 7, 2002) (creating
system of "reprography lev[ies]"); Law on Copyright and Neighboring Rights art. 55 (1994)
(BeIg.), available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID BE_003) (last visited Aug. 7, 2002)
(establishing system of "remuneration for the private reproduction of... works and
performances"); Act on Copyright 1995 § 39 (Den.), available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA
ID DK_001) (last visited Aug. 7, 2002) (requiring importers of audio or video tapes to pay
remuneration to certain copyright holders); Copyright Act art. 26a (1965) (Fin.), available
at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID FI_001) (last visited Aug. 7, 2002) (requiring importers of
recording devices to pay levies for compensation of authors); Law on the Intellectual
Property Code art. L. 311-1 (1995) (Fr.), available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID
FR_003) (last visited Aug. 7, 2002) (entitling authors to remuneration for reproduction of
protected works); Law Dealing with Copyright and Related Rights art. 54(1) (1995)
(F.R.G.), available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID DE_007) (last visited Aug. 7, 2002)
(entitling authors to equitable remuneration from the manufacturers of appliances and
1008 [Vol, 82:975
FAIR USE AND MARKET FAILURE
Yet, this private good analogy, that using the ReplayTV to obtain access to
programs without paying the customary price is just like theft of a private
good, and its associated solution are simply wrong, as a more careful analysis
will demonstrate. Consider two cases: (1) proportionate time-shifting; and (2)
disproportionate time-shifting. With proportionate time-shifting, each
television program experiences a level of time-shifting roughly proportional to
its live audience. With disproportionate time-shifting, consumers time-shift a
particular program somewhat more than other programs of comparable
popularity, either because of the program's inconvenient scheduling, the
particular importance of not missing an episode, 138 or for some other reason.
To explore how these two types of time-shifting may affect a program's
advertising revenue, we will begin with a base scenario and then examine how
the two types of time-shifting may influence the allocation of advertising
revenues between available programming. Throughout the analysis, we will
assume that: (i) there are four programs available for viewing, (ii) the programs
are equally popular, and (iii) time-shifters do not watch, and hence are not
influenced, by the advertisements on the programs they time-shift. We will
also assume, consistent with Figure 1, that time-shifting represents a
sufficiently small fraction of each consumer's television viewership so that
total consumer spending on advertised products remains constant.
In the base scenario, time-shifting technology is not yet available. Given
our assumption of equal popularity, 39 each program enjoys 25% of total
recording mediums); Copyright, Related Rights and Cultural Matters art. 18(3) (1996)
(Greece), available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID GR 212) (last visited Aug. 7, 2002)
(providing authors with fixed equitable remuneration); Law No. 93 of Feb. 5, 1992:
Provisions for the Benefit of Phonographic Companies and Remuneration for Private, Non-
Profit-Making Reproduction (Italy), available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID IT_002)
(last visited Aug. 7, 2002) (creating fixed remuneration levels for reproduction of certain
works); Act Amending the 1912 Copyright Act Concerning a Levy on the Reproduction of
Recorded Images or Sound Recordings for Personal Use, Study or Practice § 16c (1990)
(Neth.), available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID NL_004) (last visited Aug. 7, 2002)
(requiring payment of levy to creator of work for its reproduction); Code of Copyright and
Related Rights art. 82 (1991) (Port.), available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID PT_002)
(last visited Aug. 7, 2002) (establishing system of compensation for the reproduction or
recording of protected works); Consolidated Text of the Law on Intellectual Property art.
25(1) (1998) (Spain), available at http://clea.wipo.int (CLEA ID ES_070) (last visited Aug.
7, 2002) (establishing right to remuneration for the private reproduction of listed works);
Act on Copyright in Literary and Artistic Works art. 26k (Swed.) (on file with Virginia Law
Review Association); see also Council Directive 2001/29 of 22 May 2001 on the
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information
Society, art. 5.2(b), 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 16.; id., pmbl. 35 at 13.
138 1 have not considered in this analysis the possible increase in viewership that may
arise for later episodes of a program or television series because time-shifting enables
consumers to avoid missing episodes.
139 Changes in the levels of overall viewership will not alter this method of analysis so
long as the ratio of time shifters to live viewers remains constant for each program. For
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television viewership. If the advertising on each program is equally effective,
each program influences 25% of total consumer spending on the advertised
products. Each program should therefore receive 25% of the advertising
revenues, as summarized in Table 1.
Table 1
Advertising Revenues Without Time-Shifting





We can then introduce time-shifting technology and consider, for our first
case, how proportionate time-shifting would influence the allocation of
advertising revenue between the four programs. With proportionate time-
shifting, each program experiences time-shifting proportionate to its
popularity. Given our assumption of equal popularity, each program captures
25% of the live audience, 25% of the time-shifters, and 25% of the total
television viewership, as reflected in Table 2.
Table 2
Allocation of Viewership: Proportionate Time-Shifting
Program % of Live % of Time- % of Total
Audience Shifters Audience
A 25 25 25
B 25 25 25
C 25 25 25
D 25 25 25
Because each program's share of live viewership is the same as the
program's share of total viewership, proportionate time-shifting does not alter
example, assume that Program A has four live viewers and four time-shifters, Program B
has three live viewers and three time-shifters, Program C has two live viewers and two time-
shifters, and Program D has one live viewer and one time-shifter. Based upon live
viewership shares, advertisements on Program A will influence 40% of consumer spending
on advertised products, while advertisements on Programs B, C, and D will influence 30%,
20%, and 10%, respectively. If we could somehow force time-shifters to watch the
commercials as well, and as a result, a program's advertisements influenced both live
audiences and time-shifters, then based upon total viewership shares, advertisements on
Programs A, B, C, and D would influence the same 40%, 30%, 20%, and 10% of consumer
spending on advertised products as before.
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or skew the incentives available for the production of any of the programs.
Moreover, given our assumption that time-shifting remains a sufficiently small
part of television viewership so that total expenditures on advertised products
remain roughly constant, each program receives the same advertising revenue
that it would have received in the absence of time-shifting.1 40
Although the time-shifting is certainly a form of free riding, and despite the
almost knee-jerk response that free riding seems to elicit, proportionate time-
shifting affects neither the total incentives available for the creation of
television programs, nor the allocation of those incentives among the
programs. In our example, each consumer contributes to the cost of producing
three of the four programs and then free rides on the cost of producing the
fourth program. The cost of this fourth program is covered by other
consumers, who free ride in tum on the cost of producing the first, second, or
third programs, to which the first consumer contributed. The free riding is thus
reciprocal; each consumer contributes to the cost of some works and then free
rides on the costs carried by others. 141 Where the assumptions set forth in the
example apply, reciprocal free riding is Pareto optimal. Without reducing the
level or changing the direction of incentives available to create works of
authorship, reciprocal free riding increases access to and distribution of
existing works.
In the real world, however, we cannot be sure that time-shifting will be
proportionate to a program's popularity. We must therefore consider how
disproportionate time-shifting may affect the allocation of advertising revenues
between the four programs. Table 3 presents one such case, where consumers
prefer to time-shift Program A disproportionately.
140 Given that each program receives the same advertising revenue it would receive if
each consumer watched the program live, it is difficult to see why copyright should enable
the program to receive an additional royalty for the time-shifting convenience that the
Betamax made possible. But see Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(arguing that copyright owners should receive "some kind of royalty" from consumers who
"are willing to pay for the privilege of watching copyrighted work at their convenience").
From an economic perspective, a videocassette recorder is a complement to television
programming, just as television itself is, and there is no more reason to impose a levy
system on a videocassette recorder than there is on televisions, or portable radios, or the host
of other products that ensure convenient access to copyrighted works. If television networks
believe that time-shifting threatens advertising-based revenues, each can decide to switch to
some mixture of advertising and subscription fees to raise the requisite revenue. Of course,
if the networks cannot persuade Congress or a court to enact a uniform levy, then each
network must decide whether to charge a subscription fee independently, subject to the fully
appropriate rigors of competition from the other networks.
141 Landes and Posner have identified a production-side form of free riding as similarly
reciprocal. They argue that because each author relies to some extent on the work of
authors who have gone before her, it is fair and efficient for that author to allow the same
leeway to subsequent authors. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic
Analysis of Copyright, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 332 (1989).
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Table 3
Allocation of Viewership: Disproportionate Time-Shifting
Program % of Live % of Time- % of Total
Audience Shifters Audience
A 10 40 25
B 25 25 25
C 25 25 25
D 40 10 25
In this case, time-shifting may alter the distribution of the available
advertising revenues between the four programs. If consumer spending is
influenced only by advertisements that the consumer actually watches, and
consumers do not watch advertisements on programs they time-shift, then we
should expect Program A to receive only 10% of the available advertising
revenues, far less than it would have received had consumers watched each
program live.
With disproportionate time-shifting, there is again free riding, but this time,
it appears that, even if total spending on advertised goods remains constant,
disproportionate time-shifting will reduce substantially the incentives for those
programs that consumers are particularly likely to time-shift. Although, in
terms of total viewership, the first program was just as popular as the fourth, it
received only one-fourth of the fourth program's advertising revenue because
it was the program that consumers were particularly likely to time-shift. Yet, a
levy on recording machines and blank storage media is not the answer.
Instead, we can remove the distortion that disproportionate time-shifting
introduced and ensure that each program receives the appropriate advertising
revenue by taxing the fourth program the excess advertising revenue it
received (defined as the difference between the 40% of advertising revenue
that the fourth program actually received less the 25% that it would have
received but for the disproportionate time-shifting), and redistributing this
excess advertising revenue to the first program. Such a redistribution would
make up the shortfall in advertising revenue that the first program would
otherwise face as a result of the disproportionate time-shifting and would
ensure that each program received the same advertising revenue that it would
have received had each consumer watched every program live. Although such
a tax and redistribution scheme may initially seem politically and legally
unlikely, the mechanism to implement such a scheme is already in place and
operating. No government program, statutory enactment, or judicial action is
therefore necessary. So long as the first and fourth show are commonly owned
(or the advertising revenues from these two shows belong to a single entity),
that entity-the network-has already received the full advertising revenue to
which it is entitled for the two programs and needs only apportion that revenue
between the two programs appropriately. While disproportionate time-shifting
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may therefore alter the incentives available to particular works, existing market
structures should correct any resulting imbalance in program revenues,
suggesting that government intervention is neither necessary nor desirable.
Although the factual evidence presented in Sony rendered a detailed
understanding of the economic consequences of time-shifting for advertising
revenue unnecessary, a more careful reexamination of the economic
consequences of time-shifting demonstrates that Sony's conclusion that time-
shifting is unlikely to reduce either the actual or potential market for television
programs is both correct and robust. Although time-shifting may constitute
free riding, in that it enables consumers to avoid the price--exposure to
commercials-that broadcasters seek to charge for access to their programs,
time-shifting represents a desirable, indeed Pareto optimal, form of free riding.
So long as time-shifting remains a sufficiently small part of a consumer's total
television viewing that the consumer's total spending on advertised products
remains roughly constant, 142 time-shifting increases access to television
programs without reducing the associated incentives for the production of
copyrighted television programs. 143
As this example suggests, unauthorized copying does not have the same
effect as theft. The mere fact that some consumers are obtaining access
without paying the copyright owner's customary price is not sufficient to
establish that the use at issue will necessarily impair the market for or the
142 Moreover, in evaluating whether time-shifting will become so predominant that total
consumer spending on advertised products declines, we should not simply presume that
time-shifting will, if permitted, become "widespread." The Court has directed courts
evaluating the fourth fair use factor to consider "not only the extent of the market harm
caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also 'whether unrestricted and
widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant... would result in a
substantially adverse impact on the market' for the original." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) (quoting MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A][4], at 13-102.61 (rev. ed. 1994)). Such an analysis
implicitly assumes that if the use is permitted then it will necessarily become widespread.
While such a presumption may prove appropriate for the commercial infringement at issue
in Campbell, it is far less appropriate for private copying. In addition to other reasons, see
infra notes 179-183 and accompanying text, consumers may decide to watch a program live
because of the satisfaction derived from sharing the viewing experience the next day over
the water cooler. So long as most people do not time-shift, the interpersonal experience of
viewing a program live, see Lunney, supra note 116, at 882-86, provides a strong incentive
not to time-shift, even if time-shifting would reduce, in some sense, the "cost" of watching
television.
143 Only if time-shifting becomes so large a fraction of the time consumers spend
watching television that it begins to reduce total advertising revenues does time-shifting
pose some threat to the incentives for producing copyrighted television programs,
potentially justifying the adoption of a levy system. Even then, this analysis suggests that
revenues from such a levy should not be distributed based on either total audience or live
audience alone. Rather, a distribution mechanism must also consider the relative levels of
time-shifting that different programs experience.
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potential value of a copyrighted work. If a copyright owner cannot present
more concrete evidence of "a demonstrable effect upon the potential market
for, or the value of, the copyrighted work,"'144 then the use should be declared
fair and noninfringing. As the Sony Court recognized, "[t]he prohibition of
such non-commercial uses would merely inhibit access to ideas without any
countervailing benefit."' 45 On the other hand, if a copyright owner adequately
demonstrates that the use will impair the market for or value of the copyrighted
work, then she has established her own private interest in having the use
declared unfair. To demonstrate that prohibiting the use will serve the public
interest, the copyright owner must go further and establish, through relevant
evidence, the relationship between her increased revenue and increased
production of copyrighted works.
B. The Relationship Between Increased Revenue and More or Better Works:
The Examples of Television Programming and Scientific Research
If a court finds a probable reduction in the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work, then the second step in the balancing approach requires
a determination of the likely relationship, if any, between that probable
reduction and the production of copyrighted works. In the nineteenth century,
courts did not require a copyright owner to prove the relationship between her
private interest in additional revenue and the public interest in additional works
of authorship, implicitly assuming that revenue to the copyright owner was an
accurate and reasonably direct proxy for output of copyrighted works. In the
nineteenth century, this assumption may not have been unreasonable given the
narrow scope of copyright at the time. Until Congress extended copyright to
include the translation right in 1870,146 the various copyright statutes in force
usually defined the copyright in terms of "the sole right and liberty of printing,
reprinting, publishing, and vending such.., book,"'147 and courts usually
interpreted the copyright statute as giving the author "the exclusive right of
multiplying copies of what he has written or printed."'148 As applied,
nineteenth century copyright applied almost exclusively to the copying
competitor who, by avoiding the marginal cost of authoring the work, could
offer a lower priced copy of the original. By protecting a copyright owner
against the copying competitor, nineteenth century copyright sought to ensure
... Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 450.
14" Id. at 450-51.
146 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
101 (2000)).
147 Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802).
148 Perris v. Hexamer, 99 U.S. 674, 675-76 (1878) (holding that defendant had not
infringed the author's copyright on maps of New York City when defendant "used to some
extent their system of arbitrary signs and their key" in a map of Philadelphia); accord
Greene v. Bishop, 10 F. Cas. 1128, 1133-34 (D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5,762).
1014 [Vol. 82:975
FAIR USE AND MARKET FAILURE
an author a fair opportunity to recover the costs of her work.149 Because of this
cost-based focus, copyright tended to enable authors to recover in the market
something close to their persuasion costs, defined as the sum necessary to
persuade an author to undertake a given work's creation. As a result, the
assumption that any substantial change in a copyright owner's expected
revenues might affect her output was not completely unrealistic.
Over the course of the twentieth century, however, copyright has moved
from a cost-based system of protection towards a value-based system of
protection, particularly for entertaining works. Rather than limit protection to
the case of the copying competitor, copyright has sought increasingly to
protect the copyright owner against the loss of any opportunity to license the
work and to ensure thereby that the copyright owner has an opportunity to
capture fully the market value associated with her work. 150 To illustrate the
difference between cost- and value-based approaches, consider the idealized
supply and demand curves for the production of copyrighted works 151
presented in Figure 2:
149 As reflected in the four fair use factors, the key issues under a cost-based approach to
copyright protection are whether the later author has borrowed so much, and contributed so
little of her own authorship, that she can offer her work at a significantly lower price than
the original author while still covering the costs of creating her work, and the later author
has used what she has taken to create a substitute for the original. This is precisely the
approach reflected in nineteenth century copyright cases. Compare Simms v. Stanton, 75 F.
6, 13-14 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (finding that defendant's physiognomy text did not infringe
the plaintiffs text because, although the two works were competing, defendant had
contributed enough of her own material and taken sufficiently little from the plaintiff that
defendant did not have an undue cost advantage in creating her work and therefore could not
significantly underprice plaintiff's work in the market), Perris, 99 U.S. at 675-76 (finding
that the defendant's map of Philadelphia, although it duplicated the symbols and map-
making approach of the plaintiff's copyrighted map of New York, did not infringe because
the map of Philadelphia would not substitute for the plaintiffs map and hence was not a
copy), and Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,513) (finding
that the defendant's German translation of the plaintiffs copyrighted novel did not infringe
because it would not substitute for the original and hence was not a copy), superseded by
statute, Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198 (granting author exclusive right to
translate her work), with Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 347-49 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4,901) (finding that the defendant's subsequent two-volume work, entitled The Life of
Washington, infringed the plaintiffs earlier twelve-volume work, entitled the Writings of
President Washington, because consumers would consider the defendant's work a substitute
for plaintiffs and because defendant copied so much and added so little new material).
150 See, e.g., Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 534 (9th Cir. 1956) (defining
copyright as "the exclusive right to any lawful use of their property, whereby they may get a
profit out of it"), aff'd without op. by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43 (1958).
151 I have assumed for the sake of expositional convenience that we can treat the
production of copyrighted works as a coherent industry, but that is not essential to the
analysis.
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Figure 2







Under a cost-based system of protection, the goal is to provide an author
with the minimum rent required to ensure a work's creation. The rents
available under a cost-based system of copyright protection therefore follow
closely the supply curve, SS' In contrast, a value-based system seeks to ensure
that an author receives the full "value" associated with her work, defined as the
sum of consumers' reservation prices for access. The rents available under a
value-based system copyright system therefore follow more closely 152 the
demand curve, DD' The triangle SQD represents the incentives that would be
available under a value-based system of protection in excess of the work's
persuasion cost. It therefore defines precisely the excess incentives available
under a value-based system of protection.153
152 The rents available would exactly equal the demand curve if copyright and the
associated technology available enabled each copyright owner to engage in perfect or first-
degree price discrimination.
"I Although the excess incentives are simply a redistribution of income from consumers
to copyright owners, and hence irrelevant to the efficiency of copyright, there are, at least,
three reasons why excess incentives are problematic. First, to the extent that the preamble
of the Patent and Copyright Clause, permitting Congress "to promote the Progress of
Science and Useful Arts," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, is a substantive limitation on
congressional power, and not merely precatory, this limitation may trump the usual
efficiency analysis of redistributions and require some affirmative showing of public benefit
to justify a copyright regime that systematically provides excess incentives. But see Eldred
v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 377-78 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (holding that preamble to Patent and
Copyright Clause is merely precatory), cert. granted sub nora., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 122 S.
Ct. 1170 (2002). Second, following the lead of Justice Breyer, one might also argue on
fairness grounds that there is no clear reason why copyright owners' claims to a reward in
excess of their persuasion cost should prove more compelling than others' claims for a
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Because of copyright's shift towards a value-based system and associated
expansion in protection, a copyright owner's private interest in maximizing her
revenue is no longer a reasonable proxy for the public's interest in additional
works. Copyright today ensures, for all but the exactly marginal work, revenue
in excess, and sometimes radically in excess, of the work's persuasion cost.
The availability of these excess incentives for almost all copyrighted works has
sharply attenuated the relationship between a reduction in the copyright
owner's revenue and the production of copyrighted works. By definition,
when excess revenues are present, the copyright owner could experience some
reduction in the market for or value of her work, yet still receive sufficient
incentive to ensure her work's production.
In balancing the competing public interests at stake in a fair use
determination, courts today should, because of copyright's shift to a value-
based system of protection, evaluate more directly the relationship, if any,
between additional revenues and more or better works. In doing so, courts
should not seek to convert copyright into a form of rate regulation, where
copyright owners present evidence of their fixed and marginal cost and courts
tailor protection to ensure each owner a reasonable retum on her investment,
because such a system presents too great a risk of government censorship or
favoritism. 154 Rather, courts should evaluate the likely relationship between
incentives and output at a more general level, for particular classes of works,
based upon the evidence presented and the market structure of the relevant
industry. Once a court has determined the likely relationship between
marginal changes in revenue and marginal changes in output, that relationship
should become a factor in calibrating the fair use balance. Specifically, as the
likely relationship between incentives and output becomes more attenuated,
similar entitlement. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright Protection: A
Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281,
286 (1970) ("In fact, why is the author's moral claim to be paid more than his persuasion
costs any stronger than the claim of others also responsible for producing his book: the
publisher, the printer, the bookseller, and those responsible for the literature of the past that
inspired him?"). Third, even limiting our analysis to more traditional efficiency
considerations, the availability of excess incentives may also lead to competition among
copyright owners for the excess incentives. As Judge Posner has noted, this competition
may convert what would otherwise be social surplus into cost-a possibility clearly
reflected in the ever-increasing cost and ever-decreasing success rate for many types of
copyrighted works. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN EcoNoMic PERSPECTIVE
11 (1976) ("[A]n opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of monopoly
profits will attract real resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize, and by consumers to
prevent being charged monopoly prices."); see also Richard A. Posner, The Social Cost of
Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECoN. 807 (1975).
154 The Second Circuit appears to have suggested such a "rate-regulation" approach for
reconciling the potential conflict between access and incentives in the area of privately-
drafted materials that become public law. See County of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate
Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 194-95 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that a county government may
present its claim for copyright infringement of its official tax maps).
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then for any given public interest in access, the copyright owner will have to
establish more substantial market impairment in order to justify finding the use
unfair. Consider two examples.
For the first, we will return to the issue of time-shifting and assume for the
sake of argument that time-shifting would probably reduce the revenue
associated with copyrighted television programs. In order to tie that probable
loss in revenue to the public interest, we must consider how the revenue
reduction will impact the production of copyrighted television programs at the
margins given the structure of the television industry. When an enterprise such
as a television network allocates its available revenues among its various
factors of production, any revenue in excess of persuasion costs will
necessarily be allocated to those scarce factors not easily replaced. Marginal
television programs, in the sense of programs that are either relatively
unpopular or of unproven and hence uncertain popularity, are both easily
replaced and essentially indistinguishable from a host of alternative
programming. Each year when the four television networks look to replace
existing programs that have proven unsuccessful, they "evaluate thousands of
concepts for new series and purchase approximately 600 pilot scripts."'155
Although networks can judge the quality of the scripts and the subsequent
pilots, they have "no reliable basis for predicting whether audiences,
advertisers, and critics will accept the series. ' 156 If "'all hits are flukes,""' 157 as
television executives often insist, then the marginal programs are near-perfect
substitutes for one another. As a result, these marginal programs should
receive only their opportunity costs of production from the network.
In the absence of some "interference" with the television program market,
additional revenues, whether received through a levy scheme or some other
means, will flow not to the encouragement of these marginal works, but to the
scarce factors of production-represented in the television business by those
programs with a proven popularity that can serve to anchor the remainder of a
network's line-up. An analogous problem arises in professional sports where a
team must allocate its available revenue among the owner, the coaches, the star
players, and the rest of the team. If star players are relatively scarce and there
is a relative abundance of substitutes available for the other positions or team
members, then in allocating the revenue available for player salaries among the
various team members, we should expect the star players to receive the lion's
155 William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, "All Hits are Flukes": Institutional Decision
Making and the Rhetoric of Network Prime-Time Program Development, 99 AM. J. SOC.
1287, 1288 (1994).
156 Id. at 1290.
157 Id. (quoting Jeff Sagansky, President, CBS Entertainment as quoted in BETSY FRANK,
ON AIR: PRIMETIME PROGRAMMING DEVELOPMENT 1991-92, 1 (1991)); see also MURIEL G.
CANTOR & JOEL M. CANTOR, PRIME-TIME TELEVISION: CONTENT AND CONTROL 70 (1992)
(presenting examples to show how the television industry is unpredictable); TODD GITLIN,
INSIDE PRIME TIME 31-45 (2000) (reviewing the unpredictabilities of the television industry).
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share and the rest to receive only the minimum salary necessary to persuade
them to play. This is precisely what happened in professional sports. The
problem became so severe that one of the first goals of each of the players'
unions in collective bargaining was to negotiate a minimum player salary to
ensure that all players received, at the very least, a "livable" wage. 158 In the
television business, the Screen Actor's Guild and other guilds have attempted
to ensure a similar "livable" wage for those involved with marginal works.' 59
Because these guilds have some market power, an increase in total revenues
may enable them to press for a slightly higher minimum wage in their
negotiations with the networks and studios. To the extent the guilds are
successful in their negotiations, an increase in total revenues may lead to some
increase in the minimum wages for actors, screenwriters, and others involved
in the production of marginal works. To that extent, an increase in total
revenues may encourage the production of marginal works. Yet, established
stars and popular programs also have market power. As a result, some part of
any increase in revenues for television networks will simply increase the
excess incentives copyright already ensures for the most popular works.' 60 An
increase in these excess incentives may improve slightly the quality of the
most popular programs, though it is hard to see how increased salaries for the
cast of Friends will improve their abilities as actors.' 61 An increase in the
excess incentives available for the most popular works may also somehow
trickle down to the marginal programs, though, for reasons that I have
explained elsewhere, that is unlikely. 162 In the end, however, given that the
incentives available for these programs already far exceed the persuasion cost
necessary to ensure their creation, changes in the excess incentives available
are likely to influence the marginal production of copyrighted television
programs only indirectly, if at all.' 63 As Figure 2 illustrates, even with a value-
based approach, total industry output will not (and should not) exceed the
point, identified by Q, at which the demand for an additional work outstrips the
158 For a discussion of the inequities that have developed with respect to professional
wrestling in the absence of a union, see Stephen S. Zashin, Bodyslam from the Top Rope:
Unequal Bargaining Power and Professional Wrestling's Failure to Unionize, 12 U. MIAMI
ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 1 (1994) (addressing "the bargaining power disparity that exists in
professional wrestling" and suggesting "that unionization within the industry could provide
a more evenhanded contest").
I" See, e.g., Emily C. Chi, Star Quality and Job Security: The Role of the Performers'
Unions in Controlling Access to the Acting Profession, 18 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1,21 -
23 (2000).
161 See id. at 22 (noting the vast disparity that persists despite the acting guilds between
the wages of average union members and stars).
16 One might argue that the higher salaries will ensure that the actors will remain with
the program, but by increasing the actors' wealth, it may also encourage them to substitute
leisure for labor and retire earlier. See Lunney, supra note 116, at 890-92.
162 See id. at 873-81.
163 See id. at 870-82.
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persuasion cost associated with that work.
Given the structure of the television industry, we should therefore expect
that slight changes in a television network's revenue are unlikely to affect the
marginal production of copyrighted television programs. Even if there is some
relationship between the level of excess incentives available and marginal
output, we should certainly expect the relationship between changes in revenue
and changes in output to prove far less direct than was the relationship between
revenue and output under the nineteenth century's cost-based approach to
copyright protection.1 64 Depending on the specific factual evidence presented
regarding how an increase (or decrease) in the revenues available is typically
allocated within the industry, even a substantial reduction in revenue may have
little discernible effect on the marginal quality of television programming
available. 65 A court should therefore require a somewhat more substantial
interference with the "potential market for, or value of" a copyrighted
television program before finding any given use unfair.
In the time-shifting example, the relationship between additional revenue
and marginal output was present, but indirect. In other cases, that relationship
may prove almost entirely absent. To illustrate, consider our second
example-the photocopying of copyrighted scientific articles for purposes of
scientific research at issue in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc. 166
Following the market failure approach to fair use, the Second Circuit ruled, by
a 2-1 vote, that Texaco Research's practice of copying articles from scientific
journals at the request of, and for use by, its researchers constituted copyright
infringement. 67 Scarcely acknowledging the possibility that such copying
might itself serve to promote the progress of science, 168 the majority
condemned Texaco Research's practice because it denied the copyright owners
164 Even in the nineteenth century, courts required a plaintiff to demonstrate a substantial
loss in revenue before they would declare a use unfair. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas.
342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) ("If so much is taken, that the value of the
original [was] sensibly diminished, or the labors of the original author [were] substantially
to an injurious extent appropriated by another, that is sufficient, in a court of law, to
constitute a piracy pro tanto.").
165 As I have noted elsewhere, see Lunney, supra note 116, at 919 n.329, the Motion
Picture Association of America and others once insisted that a failure to impose levies on
home-taping equipment would leave "the audiovisual marketplace.., a barren wasteland of
programming that does not edify, nor inspire, nor entertain." JAMES LARDNER, FAST
FORWARD: HOLLYWOOD, THE JAPANESE, AND THE ONSLAUGHT OF THE VCR 229 (1987)
(citation omitted). Despite these pleas, Congress refused to enact the requested levies, and. it
is difficult to believe that television programming today is less entertaining, less edifying, or
less inspiring because of that refusal.
166 0 F.3d 913, 922-24 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. dismissed, 516 U.S. 1005 (1995).
167 Id. ("We agree with the District Court's conclusion that Texaco's photocopying of
eight particular articles from the Journal of Catalysis was not fair use.").
168 Id. at 922-23 ("The District Court properly emphasized that Texaco's photocopying
was not 'transformative."').
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a potential source of revenue. Reasoning in a circular path, the majority
argued that if it found copyright infringement, then Texaco Research would
have to pay a licensing fee for the copying, and if Texaco Research had to pay
a licensing fee, then the loss of that fee as a potential revenue source would
sustain a claim for copyright infringement. 169 By finding the use unfair, the
Second Circuit forced Texaco Research and other commercial research
institutions to pay a fee for the copies their researchers need. To the extent that
the ability to charge a separate fee per copy will enhance the ability of the
copyright owners to price discriminate, 170 the fee will increase the revenue of
the copyright owners. The question remains, however, whether, and if so,
how, this increase in revenue will affect the production of copyrighted
scientific journal articles.
As the American Geophysical majority noted, the publishers of the scientific
journals selected articles for publication from unsolicited submissions and,
once an article was selected for publication, required the authors to assign their
copyright to the publisher. 71 In return, the publisher agreed to publish the
article, but "no form of money payment [was] ever provided to [the]
authors."'172 Although the majority admitted this fact, they did not further
consider it in their analysis. Instead, the majority appeared to assume that
increased revenue to the copyright owner would necessarily increase the
production of copyrighted works.
Yet, in this case, added revenue for the publishers must come from those
who use these scientific journals for their work, including institutions like
Texaco Research. To pay these additional licensing fees, research institutions
must either pass along the additional fees to consumers through higher prices
or compensate for this new expense by cutting expenses elsewhere. If research
institutions sold their discoveries in perfectly competitive markets, perhaps
they could pass the increased licensing fees along to their consumers.
However, if the markets for their discoveries were perfectly competitive, the
research institutions would not exist. To cover the fixed costs of innovations,
patents, secrecy, or other means of obtaining a lead-time advantage must offer
research institutions some market power in the exploitation of their discoveries
in order for their research to prove profitable. As a result, while research
169 Id.
170 Historically, the copyright owners engaged in limited price discrimination by
charging libraries and commercial entities higher subscription fees than individuals. The
ability to charge an additional fee for each journal article copied will improve the ability of
the copyright owners to price discriminate among the commercial entities if the commercial
entities' reservation values for access to the information contained in the journal articles are
reasonably proportional to the number of photocopies of the journal articles each entity
makes.
17' Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 915 ("Authors are informed that they must
transfer the copyright in their writings to [the publisher] if one of their articles is accepted
for publication . .
172 Id.
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institutions may be able to pass some of these licensing fees along to
consumers, part of the fees will come out of the rents the research institutions
would otherwise earn on their discoveries. As these rents would otherwise go
towards the costs of the research itself, using some part of these rents to pay
licensing fees for copies of scientific journal articles means that research
institutions will have to cut expenses elsewhere. As a practical matter, this
means that institutions like Texaco Research will have to reduce their
expenditures on research personnel, supplies, or facilities in order to come up
with the licensing fees that the American Geophysical majority made possible.
The American Geophysical decision thus increased payments to publishers, but
such increased payments will come at the expense of the authors and their
research.
Increasing the revenue of publishers at the expense of the authors and their
underlying research scarcely seems likely "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science," as the Constitution requires. More money for publishers may lead to
more journals. 73 But unless there is an existing body of valuable scientific
work presently denied publication because of limited journal space, it is almost
impossible to see any connection between increased revenues for the copyright
owners in this case and increased production of copyrighted works. Perhaps
the top journals will begin to share their newfound wealth with the authors
through royalties, 174 but as yet, that remains only a speculative possibility. 175
Given that Sony held that the mere possibility that a use may reduce "the
potential market for, or value of," a copyrighted work is insufficient to
establish unfair use, 176 it would seem that the mere possibility that additional
173 To the extent that scientific journals exhibit strong network characteristics, in that
researchers tend to read only the most popular journals that every other researcher is reading
as well, the fees may simply increase the excess incentives available to the most popular
journals.
174 Following the rationale of the market failure approach, the American Geophysical
court distinguished the Court of Claims' earlier decision finding that photocopying for
scientific research was a fair use on the grounds that the Copyright Clearance Center had
established a market for photocopying licenses since the Williams & Wilkins case had been
decided. See Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 924 ("As the District Court observed, 'To
the extent the copying practice was "reasonable" in 1973 [when Williams & Wilkins was
decided], it has ceased to be "reasonable" as the reasons that justified it before
[photocopying license] have ceased to exist."' (citation omitted)). It will be curious to see if
courts remain equally willing to revisit the photocopying issue should the journals refuse to
share part of their newfound wealth with authors.
[75 Even if royalties become the norm, the significant capital costs involved in many
areas of scientific research effectively preclude royalties from serving as the primary source
of funding for such research.
176 Compare Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)
(requiring copyright owner to establish "by a preponderance of the evidence" that the use at
issue creates "some meaningful likelihood" of harm to the potential market for, or value of,
the work), with id. at 484 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (requiring copyright owners to
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revenues might lead to additional works should prove similarly insufficient.
Sony and American Geophysical Union both illustrate the dangers of
presuming that a reduction in "the potential market for, or value of' the
copyrighted work remains a reasonable proxy for the public interests copyright
protection is intended to serve. Given copyright's shift to a value-based
system of protection, courts should require a copyright owner to demonstrate,
by the preponderance of the evidence, that the use at issue will reduce both her
revenues and the output of creative works at the margins. Only after the
copyright owner has made such a showing should a court proceed to the third
step of identifying the public's direct interest in allowing the use to continue.
C. Identifying the Public Interest in the Unauthorized Use: The Example of
Private Sharing of Music Files
Once a copyright owner has established that a use interferes with the
public's interest in additional works, the third step in the balancing approach is
to identify the public's interest in allowing the use to continue. If fair use is, in
truth, a balancing, then even a substantial reduction in copyright revenues and
associated reduction in copyrighted works is, on its own, insufficient to
demonstrate that a use is unfair. 77 Because of the public good character of
copyrighted works, the key fair use question, from an economic perspective, is
whether, on balance, society would be better or worse off by allowing the use
to continue.
Because of the historical context in which they developed, the four statutory
fair use factors expressly permit a court to consider the direct social benefit of
allowing a transformative use to continue. 7 8 None of the four, however,
considers directly the value that a use may generate simply by expanding
demonstrate only "a potential for harm").
77 Finding a fair use despite a substantial interference with a copyright owner's potential
market may run afoul of our obligations under Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and
Article 13 of the TRIPs agreement. See Berne Convention for The Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, art. 9(2), 1161 U.N.T.S. 31, 37 ("It shall be a matter for
legislation in the countries of the Union to permit reproduction of work in certain special
cases . . . ."); Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, § 1, art. 13, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex
IC, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994)
("Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases
which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder."). However, rather than interpret our
fair use doctrine to avoid any possibility of conflict, the better approach is to allow the
potential conflict to arise. Allowing the conflict to arise will both ensure that an actual
conflict exists and will force the conflict into the open so that Congress will become aware
that signing these types of treaties imposes a direct cost on U.S. consumers, in addition to
whatever potential for export revenues they may generate.
178 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578-85, 586-89 (1994)
(considering the value added by defendants' parody under the first and third factors).
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access to existing works. The reason for this omission again lies in the
nineteenth century origins of the four fair use factors. At that time, the only
means available to expand access to an existing work was for a competing
printer to copy the work and sell it at a lower price. As this was, and is, the
paradigm case of copyright infringement, the unfair nature of such a use was in
a sense predetermined. Express consideration of increased access alone as a
potential social benefit was therefore unnecessary.
Yet, technology has changed radically since the nineteenth century. Today,
private sharing of copyrighted works may increase access to existing works
without undermining as extensively as the copying competitor of the
nineteenth century incentives for the creation of future works. As I have
explained elsewhere, there are at least three potentially material differences
between private copying and a commercial competitor's copying in terms of
their effects on the incentives to create additional works. First, although we
often assume that consumers will free ride if they can, empirical research and
real world evidence have demonstrated that consumers will usually contribute
to the cost of a public good even where they could otherwise obtain the benefit
of the public good without charge.' 79 Among other reasons, a consumer may
contribute out of the conviction that paying her share is the right thing to do.' 80
A copying competitor is unlikely to be similarly motivated.
Second, because the purpose of private sharing is often to obtain a copy of a
work without charge, a consumer will not simply purchase the work and make
a copy, as that would defeat her purpose. Instead, she must find some other
consumer who is willing to share. Consumers are more likely to seek and
more likely to find popular works when they engage in private copying
because the enjoyment of copyrighted works exhibits network externalities.' 81
As a result, private copying is likely to occur disproportionately with respect to
the most popular works.' 82 It may therefore reduce the excess incentives
'79 See Lunney, supra note 116, at 858-65 (arguing that "too much attention has been
paid to the assumption that if consumers can obtain copies for free, the vast majority of
them will do so").
180 Id. (identifying altruism, the "warm-glow effect," long-term self-interest, reputational
concerns, and informal cooperation as reasons why individuals may choose to contribute,
rather than free ride, even where free riding alternative was available).
81 A network externality arises when "the utility that a user derives from consumption of
the good increases with the number of other agents consuming the good." Michael L. Katz
& Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
424,424(1984).
182 In a recent study of Gnutella usage, for example, Eytan Adar and Bernardo A.
Huberman found that the vast majority of Gnutella queries (that is, file requests) are
concentrated on a relatively few topics. Based upon a recorded set of 202,509 Gnutella
queries, they report that:
The top 1 percent of those queries accounted for 37% of the total queries on the
Gnutella network. The top 25 percent account for over 75% of the total queries. In
reality these values are even higher due to the equivalence of queries ("britney spears"
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otherwise available for such works without affecting the incentives available
for the production of marginal works. In contrast, a copying competitor
expects to earn a profit on her copying. She can therefore simply purchase an
authorized copy and need not worry about finding someone who will share
another authorized copy with her. Moreover, a copying competitor would,
absent copyright, copy any work so long as the copying offers a potential
profit.183 Given that every author must price somewhat above marginal cost in
order to recover her authorship investment, even marginal works offer a
potentially profitable opportunity for a copying competitor. Allowing copying
by competitors would therefore likely threaten more directly than private
copying the incentives available for marginal works.
Third, because copyright enables an author to price her work somewhat
above the marginal cost of additional copies, copyright generates a deadweight
welfare loss. In order to force high reservation value consumers to reveal their
true preference structure and purchase an authorized copy rather than free ride,
copyright owners have used their exclusive rights to deny access to low
reservation value consumers. In the nineteenth century, when a copying
competitor was the only means to expand access to low reservation value, there
was no effective way to separate and serve low reservation value consumers
without also destroying the paying market made up of high reservation value
consumers. If a copying competitor were allowed to enter the market, her
work would be available through the same channels as the original, but at a
lower price. Both high and low reservation value consumers would therefore
find the copying competitor's version attractive as a substitute for the original.
Today, however, the technology that enables private sharing may allow low
reservation value consumers to obtain an unauthorized copy without interfering
unduly with the copyright owner's ability to charge high reservation value
vs. "spears britney").
Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman, Free Riding on Gnutella, FIRST MONDAY (Oct.
2000), at http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_lO/adar/index.html (last visited May 29,
2002).
183 While, at first glance, one might suppose that a copier could earn the most profit from
copying a popular work, popular works would (but for copyright) likely attract a crowd of
copiers that would tend to eliminate any possibility of profitably copying such works.
Because of this profit motivation, if one copying competitor's use is found fair, other
copying competitors will enter the field until the economic rents associated with copying are
entirely dissipated. For that reason, in this for-profit setting, courts should consider not only
the market effect of the particular use at issue, but the impact if the use becomes
"unrestricted and widespread." See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 590 (stating that the fourth fair
use factor, the effect of the use on the potential market or value of the work, requires courts
to consider whether unrestricted and widespread conduct would result in a substantially
adverse impact on the potential market). When we move to a use outside of this copying
competitor, for-profit setting, the assumption that a use, such as private copying, once
permitted, will become widespread makes far less sense. See Lunney, supra note 116, at
858-68 (noting that private copying may prove self-limiting).
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consumers the market price for an authorized copy. Unlike distribution by a
copying competitor, private sharing usually takes place through different
channels of distribution and entails a somewhat higher cost in terms of time
and inconvenience than would simply purchasing an authorized copy. To the
extent that low reservation value consumers typically have more time and less
money available for works of authorship, private copying may make copies of
existing works available to low reservation value consumers without becoming
an effective substitute from the perspective of high reservation value
consumers. Private sharing may therefore provide copies of the work to low
reservation value consumers who could not afford an authorized copy's market
price in any event, and yet not interfere with the copyright owner's sales to
high reservation value consumers.
To the extent that private copying expands access to existing works without
decreasing the copyright owner's revenues and the resulting incentive to create
additional works, private copying is Pareto optimal and should constitute a fair
use. Moreover, even if private copying decreases revenues to some extent and
is thus not Pareto optimal, private copying may nevertheless expand access to
an existing work substantially more for any given reduction in revenue than
would a competitor's copying. As a result, courts should not presume that
private copying has the same economic consequences as copying by a
competitor, but should expressly consider the increase in access that the private
copying achieves for any given reduction in revenue. Consider A&MRecords,
Inc. v. Napster, Inc. 184
In granting and affirming the grant of a preliminary injunction against
Napster's file-sharing service, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit
walked through the four nineteenth century fair use factors. The private
sharing of files through Napster was nontransformative and commercial; 85 it
involved entertaining works "'closer to the core of intended copyright
protection[;]I ' ll86 and the entire work was copied.'87 As for the fourth factor-
"the effect of the use upon the potential market for, or value of," the works-
even the plaintiffs' expert admitted that "national [retail music] sales grew
'significantly and consistently"' over the four quarters studied.188 The courts
184 114 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Cal. 2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 239 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2001).
115 See id. at 912-13 (finding that downloading does not transform the music and that
"although downloading and uploading MP3 files is not paradigmatic commercial activity, it
is also not personal use in the traditional sense"), aff'd, 239 F.3d at 1015 (affirming the
district court's finding that the use was nontransformative and commercial).
186 See A&MRecords, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1016 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,
Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994)) (affirming district court's finding that the works were
creative in nature).
' See A&M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 913, aff'd, 239 F.3d at 1016 (affirming
district court's finding that entire work was copied).
188 Id. at 910 n.14 (quoting Report of Michael Fine 1, A&MRecords (No. 99-05183)),
available at www.riaa.org/PDF/fine.pdf (last visited May 30, 2002).
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nevertheless concluded that Napster "reduces CD sales among college
students" because there was a decline in retail music sales at stores located: (i)
near 67 schools where Napster had been recently banned; and (ii) near the
"Top 40 Most Wired Colleges of 1999" as identified by Yahoo Internet Life.189
Although there are aspects of the courts' fact finding that appear
questionable,1 90 a more troubling aspect of the courts' decisions is that neither
considers the clear public benefit Napster generated.
Specifically, because of copyright, the market price for a full-length music
CD hovered around $14.00 in 2000.191 Yet the marginal cost of downloading a
CD through a file-sharing service like Napster was far less, particularly for
technically sophisticated consumers with low opportunity costs for their time.
If private file-sharing through Napster or similar services is banned, there will
be a large deadweight welfare loss precisely because that ban would help the
119 Id. at 913 (finding that Napster use harms the market by reducing CD sales among
college students and raising barriers to plaintiffs' entry into the market for digital
downloading of music).
190 The causal link between Napster usage and the decline in sales is particularly
troublesome. As one study reports, most of the decline in sales for both colleges generally
and the "Top 40 Most Wired Colleges" occurred primarily between the first quarter of 1998
and the first quarter of 1999. See Report of Michael Fine 8, A&MRecords (No. 99-05183)),
available at www.riaa.org/PDF/fine.pdf (last visited May 30, 2002). Yet, Napster did not
become popular until after the first quarter of 1999, suggesting that most of the decline in
sales was unrelated to Napster's subsequent rise. See Tanya Schevitz, Download Discord:
Universities are Frustrated as Students Overwhelm Internet Lines to Access Digital Music
Files, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 3, 2000 (noting that at U.C.-Berkeley, residence halls jumped from
10% of internet traffic to 90% of traffic from November 1999 to January 2000, and that at
Indiana University, Internet usage jumped from 20% in January 2000 to 60% in February
2000). Moreover, after Napster was formally shutdown in the first half of 2001, CD sales in
the second half of 2001 fell (both in units and dollar value) over the same period a year
earlier when Napster was going strong. Compare RIAA, 2001 Yearend Statistics, at
www.riaa.com/pdf/2001yearendmanufacturersshipmentandvaluereport.pdf (last visited May
30, 2002), with RIAA, 2001 Midyear Statistics, at www.riaa.com.pdf/midyear_2001.pdf
(last visited May 30, 2002) (reflecting, in combination, that sales of CDs fell from 522.5
million units with a suggested retail price of $7,533.30 million in the second half of 2000 to
484 million units with a suggested retail price of $7,381.40 million in the second half of
2001).
191 The Federal Trade Commission has alleged that Sony's Minimum Advertised Pricing
("MAP") policy and the adoption of similar strategies by the other big four record
companies may also have played a role in 2000's high prices. Under the MAP policy,
retailers who advertised (even through in-store displays) market prices below the established
MAP for sales of compact discs faced a suspension of all cooperative advertising and
promotional funds. Through strict and well-publicized enforcement of MAP, Sony and the
other record companies managed to stabilize otherwise falling retail prices for music. See
Complaint, In re Sony Music Entm't, Inc., (No. C-3971) (filed Aug. 30, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/sonycomp.htm) (last visited May 30, 2002) (alleging that
Sony's MAP policy unreasonably restrained trade and hindered competition in the
prerecorded music market).
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recording industry maintain a large gap between the market price and the
marginal cost for the same music. Consumers who would willingly have paid
the marginal cost of a file download, yet cannot afford the work's market price,
will be forced to do without. Yet at no point during their analyses did either
the district court or the Ninth Circuit consider the elimination of this
deadweight welfare loss as a potential public benefit that might justify
allowing Napster to continue. Instead, they limited their analyses to the four
fair use factors derived from the nineteenth century fair use cases and, in direct
defiance of Congress's explicit rejection of such an approach, applied the
factors as if they were a checklist of all relevant considerations.
If we ignore the district court's clearly erroneous (or materially misleading)
finding that "[a]pproximately 10,000 music files are shared per second using
Napster" as of August 2000,192 and rely on more objective and seemingly less
biased published reports that Napster users downloaded 1.39 billion music files
in the month of September 2000, we can generate a rough estimate of the
increased access to musical works that Napster enabled. Given the extent of
the sharing that occurred in September 2000 and assuming that ten files are
equivalent to an album, 193 Napster enabled users to create essentially 139
million albums in one month. If we extend that rate over a twelve-month
period and focus exclusively on U.S. users, 194 then allowing Napster to
192 A&M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 902. Perhaps the district judge only meant
that the files were in the process of being shared, as it takes far longer than a second to
download a single musical work. See Robert Lemos, Internet Music Under the Gun?,
ZDNET NEWS, May 26, 2000 (noting that it takes 33 seconds to download a single MP3 file
on a TI connection, DSL line, or cable modem, and 15 minutes on a 56.6K modem). If she
really meant 10,000 files per second were "shared" (i.e. the downloading completed), that
would amount to the creation of 43.2 million ten-file albums each day for U.S. consumers,
or 157 billion albums per year (i.e. over 50 albums per year for each man, woman, and child
in the United States).
193 Given that the average retail price in 2000 for a full-length CD was $14.02 and the
average price for a CD single was $4.17, see RIAA, 2000 Yearend Statistics, at
www.riaa.com/pdf/year end 2000.pdf (last visited May 30, 2002) (reflecting that 942.5
million CDs were sold for a total of $13,214.5 million and 34.2 million CD singles were
sold for a total of $142.7 million in 2000), it might be more accurate to suggest that a full-
length CD consists of four tracks that consumers want and another six to eight tracks of
filler songs. IfNapster users only downloaded those songs they desire from a CD (and not
the filler), then five files might be effectively equivalent to a full-length CD for Napster
users. In that case, the downloading of 1.39 billion files per month through Napster would
amount to the equivalent of 1.67 billion albums created over the course of a year. File
sharing through Napster would thus have increased access to digital-quality music by 178%,
from 940 million full-length CDs to approximately 2.61 billion annually.
194 Jupiter Media Metrix has reported that U.S. users constituted 13.561 million of
Napster's 26.132 million total unique users in February 2001. Jupiter Media Metrix, Jupiter
Media Metrix Reports Multi-country Napster Usage Statistics for February 2001, at 2,
available at http://www.jmm.com/xp/jmm/press/2001/pr_040501.xml (last visited May 30,
2002).
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continue would have enabled U.S. users to create approximately 830 million
albums a year. Given that only 940 million authorized, full-length CDs were
sold in 1999 and in 2000,195 file-sharing through Napster would have
essentially doubled the availability of digital-quality recorded music in this
country, providing access to millions who, if left to face the market prices of
copyright owners, would have been denied access altogether. Under any
economic definition of social welfare, there is plainly some social value in
eliminating this substantial deadweight loss, yet neither the district court nor
the appeals court considered it.
Moreover, as the plaintiffs' own experts admitted, Napster nearly doubled
the distribution of digital-quality music without any discernible effect on
national sales of recorded CDs.196 All that the plaintiffs could demonstrate
was some slight, potentially unrelated, decline in sales for 92 retail music
establishments that happened to be near 107 colleges where Napster use may
have been particularly widespread. Perhaps Napster usage did, in fact, cause
this decline in sales.1 97 Perhaps this slight decline in sales, despite the value-
based nature of today's copyright protection and consequential availability of
excess incentives, 98 would somehow filter back and reduce to an equally
slight degree the production of new albums. Perhaps, however, a few albums
at the margins are not too high a price for doubling access to the most popular,
existing works. Certainly, in any utilitarian balancing of what society has to
gain and what it has to lose from prohibiting private sharing through a service
like Napster, the trade-off must be considered.
195 See RIAA, 2001 Yearend Statistics, supra note 190 (listing sales of 942.5 million CD
units shipped in 2000 and 938.9 million CD units shipped in 1999).
196 A&M Records, Inc., 114 F. Supp. 2d at 910 n. 14 (acknowledging that national sales
grew "significantly and consistently" in the first quarters of 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000).
197 More realistically, the availability of free peer-to-peer file sharing may become a
threat to the recording industry's sales as sales of authorized copies move increasingly from
the brick-and-mortar world to a digital distribution business model, though again under a
proper fair use analysis, such harm must be proven and not merely assumed.
198 The district court cited a declaration from the plaintiffs for the proposition that "[t]o
make a profit, the record company plaintiffs largely rely on the success of 'hit' or popular
recordings, which may constitute as little as ten or fifteen percent of albums released." Id.
at 908. 1 have discussed the flaws of this type of justification for excess incentives
elsewhere. See Lunney, supra note 116, at 870-82 (arguing that copyright provides much
greater protection than the public interest in creative works requires). As a general matter,
this type of reasoning mistakes cause for effect. Protection is not expansive because success
rates are low. Rather, success rates are low precisely because copyright protection is so
expansive. Specifically, because copyright protection is expansive, the potential pay-offs
from a success are exceedingly high, and they in turn justify extremely risky investments. If
protection is expanded because success rates are low, that will cause success rates to fall as
broader protection will make even riskier investments attractive.
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CONCLUSION: FAIR USE AS BALANCING
Properly understood, Sony is not concerned solely, or even principally, with
the potential consequences of market failure. Rather, Sony is concerned as
much with the consequences of market success. The efficiency of a private
market regime, so readily assumed for private goods, does not extend to the
public goods at issue in copyright. At best, the market regime that copyright
establishes may come closer to ensuring an optimal supply of copyrighted
works than a regime without any copyright and, for now, seems clearly
preferable to the plausible alternatives, such as direct government financing.
Nevertheless, because the market regime that copyright creates is inherently
inconsistent with the public good character of copyrighted works, the mere fact
that licensing can occur and that a market can develop does not ensure optimal
dissemination and production of copyrighted works. For copyrighted works,
such "market success" is not sufficient to ensure an efficient outcome. Even
with market success, there remains a fundamental tension between copyright's
system of exclusive rights and the public good character of copyrighted works.
As Justice Stevens recognized in Sony, fair use exists in order to resolve this
tension. As an inherent and express limit on each of the exclusive rights
Congress accorded copyright owners under section 106, the fair use doctrine
ensures that a copyright owner may enforce her rights to exclude others only
where, on balance, exclusivity promotes social welfare. Once we acknowledge
the public good character of copyrighted works, then, from an economic
perspective, fair use must necessarily balance, on the one hand, the potential
public benefit of additional or better works from prohibiting the use at issue,
and on the other, the potential public benefit from the use itself. In applying
this balance, we should not tie ourselves to a set of restrictive factors
developed in the nineteenth century to address a particular type of use against
the background of the technology available at that time. Rather, we should
consider directly what the public has to gain and what it has to lose for the use
at issue given today's technology and associated market structures. Under this
balancing approach, a use should be found unfair and hence infringing only
where the copyright owner has proven by the preponderance of the evidence
that society has more to gain than it has to lose by prohibiting the use at issue.
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